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PROBLEMS OF JURISDICTION AND VENUE
AND OF THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
GUSTAVUS OHLINGER
In considering the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure we cannot be unmind-
ful of the fact that the largest original contribution to the new practice in
the federal courts came from England. Hardly a page of the Notes of the
Advisory Committee but contains references to the Orders and Rules under
the English Judicature Act of 1873 and subsequent acts, and many of the
rules follow closely the language of the English models.
This may be the last gift of the Mother Country to her children;
the last of a great heritage which includes Magna Carta, the Common Law,
the Principles of Equity, the Bill of Rights, the Petition of Right, the Writ
of Habeas Corpus, Representative Government; such treasures of the spirit
and of the soul as the Canterbury Tales, the poetry of Shakespeare, the
eloquence of the English Bible; such memories as are enshrined in the in-
spiring architecture of Westminster Abbey. Today that great country is
being devastated and threatened with utter destruction. Not only in England,
but in France, and Belgium, and in every other land we see
"... beauty and anguish going hand in hand
The downward slope to death . . ."
before the unspeakable beast of the Revelation that has set out to place its
mark, the mark of the beast, upon the foreheads and in the hands of all
mankind.
The .heritage of English liberty under the law made possible the vast
development of our material aid human resources, and what ve possess and
what we have achieved we, today, in turn hold in trust for the preservation
of that heritage. Overwhelming as the industrial and mechanical forces
of totalitarianism may appear, we know that after all the instruments of
modern total war fit most readily into our own hands; we invented the air-
plane and the submarine; American genius developed the automobile and
the radio; we perfected the processes of machine manufacture; we first organ-
ized mass production; all these resources of the machine age we today are
privileged to use for the preservation of our liberty and the freedom of
mankind.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure point the contrast between two op-
posing and incompatible philosophies: the philosophy of force and brigandage
*Address before Lawyers Institute, held at Ithaca, N. Y., on August 15, 1940. [Ed.]
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and of hatred so assiduously propagandized by Germany and Japan, and the
ideal of justice between man and man which has engaged Anglo-American
jurisprudence from the earliest times and of which the Rules represent the
latest development.
Before considering the Rules in detail, let us remind ourselves briefly
that the Constitution, in Article III, Section 2, conferred on our national
government just the minimum of judicial power that would enable a federal
system, founded upon the concept of divided sovereignty, to function. But
even the minimum of judicial power assigned to the nation was not utilized
for many years. With the exception of the short-lived Judiciary Act of
1801,' passed by the dying Federalist party, and which the followers of
Jefferson promptly repealed the following year,2 federal trial courts were
not given general jurisdiction of cases arising under the Constitution, laws
and treaties of the United States until 1875. Until then the lower courts
were principally occupied with admiralty and diversity cases. By successive
process acts in 1789,3 1792,4 1828' and 1842,6 and finally by the General
Conformity Act of 1872,7 procedure, in law cases, was made to conform to
the procedure of the respective states in which the federal courts were held.
The principle of conformity to state practice continued until September 16,
1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. Now, instead
of federal conformity to state procedures, we have uniformity in federal
procedure, accompanied by an increasing pressure to conform state practice
to the federal rules. For this reason the federal rules are of vital interest
to the lawyer whose practice is chiefly in the state courts. Eventually many
of the federal rules will be adopted in state practice.
This is a development of major importance-a development in the pro-
cedural field which parallels the more obvious actions of the legislative
and executive departments by which state policies have been brought into
line with federal policies in the fields of social security, education and public
welfare.
An equally important consideration is the effect which the rules will have
upon the jurisdiction and power of the federal courts. Will the application
of the rules tend toward the expansion of jurisdiction and power through
judicial decision?
1Act of February 13, 1801, c. 4. 2 STAT. 89.2Act of March 8, 1802, c. 8. 2 STAT. 132.
3Act of Sept. 29, 1789, c. 21. 1 STAT. 93.4Act of May 8, 1792, c. 36. 1 STAT. 275.5Act of May 19, 1828, c. 68. 4 STAT. 278.
GAct of Aug. 1, 1842, c. 109. 5 STAT. 499.7Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255. 17 STAT. 196.
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History never repeats itself, but it does cast an illuminating beam ahead,
and we may, therefore, look to the effect of judicial decisions in the past.
The Act of 1816 incorporating the Second Bank of the United States con-
ferred upon the bank capacity "to sue and be sued in all state courts having
competent jurisdiction, and in any circuit court of the United States." Two
branches of the bank were located in Ohio, and the Ohio legislature, being
jealous of the intrusion of this monster of banking power in the peaceful
financial affairs of the state, imposed a tax of $50,000 on each branch. Osborn,
the auditor of state, sought to carry out the mandate of the legislature, and
the bank brought suit in the United States Circuit Court to enjoin him.
The case finally came before the Supreme Court s presenting there the ques-
tion whether a suit by a corporation created by act of Congress was one
"arising under the laws of the United States," and, therefore, within the
judicial power conferred in Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution and
within the jurisdiction of a federal circuit court. Chief Justice Marshall laid
down the principle that a case arises under a law of the United States when
"the title or right set up by the party may be defeated by one construction
of the Constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite
construction," and then applied the principle to the case before him merely
because the bank had been created by an act of Congress, though the con-
struction of that act was in no way involved and had nothing whatever to
do with the controversy before the court.
The doctrine of Osborn v. Bank became important when the Judiciary Act
of 18750 first conferred upon the federal courts general jurisdiction of cases
arising under tle Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.
When Congress incorporated the Pacific railroads the Court followed Osborn
v. Bank and held that every action by or against such a railroad, whether
involving a condemnation of property, a personal injury or an engine run-
ning over livestock was one "arising under a law of the United States."' 0
But against this extension of jurisdiction by judicial decision Congress
took action. By successive acts it cut down the jurisdiction as to cases
involving federal corporations until today Section 42 of Title 28 of the
United States Code declares that "no district court shall have jurisdiction
of any action or suit by or against any corporation upon the ground that
it was incorporated by or under an Act of Congress." The only exception
provided in the section is in those cases wherein "the Government of the
United States is the owner of more than one-half of its capital stock."
8Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (U. S. 1824).
9Act of March 3, 1875, c. 137. 18 STAT. 470.
1oPacific Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 2, 5 Sup. Ct. 1113 (1884).
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Finally the Supreme Court itself repudiated the doctrine of Osborn v. Bank
by declaring that "the nature of the federal right to be established is decisive-
not the source of the authority to establish it.""
The same process of judicial extension appears in the development of
jurisdiction in diversity cases. In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 2
decided in 1809, Chief Justice Marshall looked to the citizenship of the presi-
dent and directors and company of the bank on the one side, and finding that
they were citizens of Pennsylvania, while the defendants were citizens of
Georgia, upheld jurisdiction on the basis of diversity. Following this deci-
sion, in 1840, in Commercial & Railroad Bank of Vicksburg v. Slocomb,
Richards & Co.,13 the Court denied jurisdiction because two of the stock-
holders of plaintiff bank were citizens of the same state as parties on the
other side of the controversy. But four years later the Court reversed itself,
and in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson,'4 held flatly that
a corporation created by a state was, for the purposes of diversity juris-
diction, "a citizen of that state, as much as a natural person." This simple
declaration extended enormously the jurisdiction of the federal courts; it
made them the favorite forum for corporate controversies, and the dockets of
the federal courts have been crowded with corporate diversity cases ever since.
The same extension is seen in the field of admiralty. In The Steamboat
Thomas Jefferso%'5 the Supreme Court, following English precedents, limited
the admiralty jurisdiction to the sea and waters within the ebb and flow
of the tide; but beginning with The Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh,16 the juris-
diction was expanded by court decision until now the federal jurisdiction in
admiralty covers the entire navigable waters of the United States where
commerce may be carried on between different states or with foreign
nations.-6
As we have seen, the extension of judicial power and jurisdiction under
the doctrine of Osborn v. Bank was finally vetoed by Congress, and Chief
11Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 57 Sup. Ct. 96 (1936).
125 Cranch 61, 3 L. ed. 38 (U. S. 1809).
'14 Pet. 60, 10 L. ed. 354 (U..S. 1840).
"42 How. 497, 11 L. ed. 353 (U. S. 1844). See the stinging criticism of this decision
by Justice Daniel in Rundel v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 14 How. 80, 101, 14
L. ed. 335 (U. S. 1852).
1510 Wheat. 428, 6 L. ed. 358 (U. S. 1828).
1612 How. 443, 13 L. ed. 1058 (U. S. 1852).
16'The recent Supreme Court case, United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Company, 9 U. S. L. WEEK. 4069 (Dec. 16, 1940), further extends this jurisdiction by
holding that "navigable" includes "available for navigation with reasonable improve-
ments"; and that the power of the United States over its waters is not limited to con-
trol of the operation of boats and improvement of the waterways, but includes flood
protection, watershed development, and recovery of the cost of improvements through
utilization of power. [Ed.]
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Justice Marshall's construction of the phrase "arising under the Constitution,
laws and treaties of the United States" has now been repudiated by the
Supreme Court itself. On the other hand, the extension of jurisdiction
under the diversity and admiralty clauses still stands, and there seems little
likelihood that either Congress or the Supreme Court will ever limit the
doctrines of the Letson and The Genessee Chief cases, and of succeeding
cases.17 The development of corporate organizations and the expanding com-
merce on inland waterways have placed the approving stamp of realism
upon those decisions.
But does the application of the new rules require a similar extension, by
judicial decision, of the jurisdiction and power of the federal courts?
First of all, the Rules have abandoned the term "cause of action," familiar
to lawyers under the Equity Rules' 8 and under most of the Codes.' 9 Pro-
fessor Pomeroy years ago analyzed the term "cause of action" as follows :20
"Every action is based upon some primary right held by the plaintiff,
and upon a duty resting upon the defendant corresponding to such right."
He then goes on:
"By means of a wrongful act or omission of the defendant, this pri-
mary right and this duty are invaded and broken; and there immedi-
ately arises from the breach a new remedial right of the plaintiff, and
a new remedial duty of the defendant."
He concludes:
"It is very clear from this analysis that the 'cause of action' men-
tioned in the codes includes and consists of these two branches or ele-
ments in combination,--the primary right and duty of the respective
parties, and the wrongful act or omission by which they are violated or
broken."
But long before the adoption of the Rules, the Supreme Court had an-
nounced its departure from this abstract concept of the content of a law
17 See S. B. 937 [75 CONG. RFc. 196 (1931)], introduced by Senator George W. Norris,
for the purpose of limiting diversity jurisdiction in so far as it affected foreign corpo-
rations doing business in a state. President Hoover recommended such limitation, but
the bill failed of passage. As against this effort to limit the jurisdiction in corporate
diversity cases it should be noted that the decision in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp. 308 U. S. 165, 60 Sup. Ct. 153 (1939), by depriving foreign corporations
doing business in a state of objections to venue on account of non-residence, has greatly
enlarged the opportunity of recourse to the district courts.1SEQuITy RuLE 26: "The plaintiff may join in one bill as many causes of action,
cognizable in equity, as he may have against the defendant." (Italics supplied.)
'
9 As examples see UTAH Rav. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 104-7-2; 2 IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns,
1933) §§ 2-1004, 2-1015; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 11305.
20pO oy, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 413.
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suit. Thus in United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 21 decided in 1933,
it said:
"A 'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose and some-
thing different for another. It may mean one thing when the question
is whether it is good upon demurrer, and something different when there
is a question of the amendment of a pleading or of the application of
the principle of res judica. Cf. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schen-
del, 270 U. S. 611, 617; Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316,
321. At times and in certain contexts, it is identified with the infringe-
ment of a right or the violation of a duty. At other times and in other
contexts, it is a concept of the law of remedies, the identity of the cause
being then dependent on that of the form of action or the writ. Another
aspect reveals it as something separate from writs and remedies, the
group of operative facts out of which a griea'nce has developed. This
court has not committed itself to the view that the phrase is susceptible
of any single definition that will be independent of the context or of the
relation to be governed. None the less, it has fixed the limits of amend-
ment with increasing liberality. A change of the legal theory of the
action, 'a departure from law to law,' has at times been offered as a
test. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wyler, 158 U. S. 285, 295. Later deci-
sions have made it clear that this test is no longer accepted as one of
general validity. Thus, in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Wulf,
226 U. S. 570, plaintiff suing in her individual capacity under a Kansas
statute for her son's death was allowed to amend to sue as administratrix
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act after the statute of limi-
tations would have barred another action. In New York Central & H.
R.R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, there was in substance the same
ruling. In Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U. S. 207, a cause of action by
a defrauded buyer to set aside a contract was turned into a cause of action
to recover damages for deceit. 'Of course an argument can be made
on the other side, but where a defendant has had notice from the begin-
ning that the plaintiff sets up and is trying to enforce a claim against it
because of specified conduct, the reasons for the statute of limitations do
not exist, and we are of opinion that a liberal rule should be applied.'
New York Central & H. R.R. Co. v. Kinney, supra, p. 346."
Finally, in Gully v. First National Bank -2 2 the Court recalled, passim, that
it had had "occasion to point out how futile is the attempt to define a 'cause
of action' without reference to the context."
For the familiar term of the Codes, the Rules have substituted "claim
for relief"-a term sufficiently flexible to accommodate a narrower concept
when the question involves the application of a state statute of limitation,
framed on the abstract concept of cause of action, when a party seeks to
21288 U. S. 62, 67, 53 Sup. Ct. 278 (1933). The italics in this, and other quotations,
are supplied.22299 U. S. 109, 57 Sup. Ct. 96 (1936).
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
amend by bringing in allegations which under the state concept constitute a
new cause of action against which the statute has run ;23 a narrower concept
when a judgment as to a cause of action under a state statute is pleaded as
against an action under federal statute arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence,2A or when a judgment in an action for personal injuries under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act is pleaded as a bar to an action for
death by reason of the same injuries ;25 a narrower concept where under
state law different acts, though causing one injury, give rise to different,
causes of action, and a judgment of a state court is pleaded as res judicata
to an action upon the other acts in a federal court ;26 a different concept
where, as in Hum v. Oursler,27 it is necessary to define "cause of action"
for the purpose of determining the bounds between the jurisdiction of state
and federal courts.
But so far as actions commenced in the district courts are concerned, the
term "claim for relief" has a wide scope. It is not limited by any abstract
concept of a primary right in one party and a wrongful act or omission on
the part of some other party, but looks to "the group of operative facts out
of which a grievance has developed." In the liberal provisions which the
Rules make for different statements of a claim or defense, either alternatively
or hypothetically, for the statement of separate claims and defenses, regard-
less of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable grounds or on
both,28 for the joinder of claims and remedies,29 for the joinder of parties, 80
for counterclaims,31 for third-party claims,8 2 for class actions3 and inter-
vention,3 4 they look to the presentation of numerous claims and for the
participation of multiple parties in a single civil action "on the theory that it
is a sound and a desirable thing that all spots of irritation between the parties
should be brought out into the open and should be fought over and disposed
of at one time."3
But however sound and desirable this may be, we, in our federal system,
23Taylor Co. v. Anderson, 275 U. S. 431, 48 Sup. Ct. 144 (1928).24Troxell v. Del., Lack. & West. R.R., 227 U. S. 434, 33 Sup. Ct. 274 (1913).2 5Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R.R. v. Carroll, 280 U. S. 491, 50 Sup. Ct. 182 (1930).
26Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 266 Fed. 798, 802 (C. C. A. 3d 1920).
27289 U. S. 238, 53 Sup. Ct. 586 (1933).2 8RULE 8 (e) (2).
2 9RuLE 18.
3 0 RuLE 19.3 1RULE 13.3 2RULE 14.
a RuLE 23.3 4RULE 24.3 5judge Charles E. Clark, in PROCEEDINGS OF WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (1938) 58;
PROCEEDINGS OF CLEVELAND INSTITUTE (1938) 247; Warren v. Indian Refining Co.,
30 F. Supp. 281 (D. Ind. 1939).
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are confronted immediately by limitations of jurisdiction and venue, and Rule
82 expressly provides that the Rules "shall not be construed to extend or
limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States or the venue
of actions therein."
In the famous case of Hum v. Oursler3" there were three very aggravated
and inflamed spots of irritation between the parties. The plaintiffs claimed
that they owned a copyrighted play called "The Evil Hour"; that they had
subsequently revised the play, but the revision was uncopyrighted; that a
feature of their play was the representation of a spiritualistic seance on the
stage, with the audience taking part therein; that defendants were the owners
of a copyrighted play called "The Spider," which, as originally produced,
contained no representation of a spiritualistic seance; that plaintiffs had
submitted their play, both in its copyrighted and in its uncopyrighted revision,
to defendants for their consideration as to its production; that instead of
producing plaintiff's play, "The Evil Hour," defendants incorporated the
idea of a seance in their play "The Spider," and produced that play. Plain-
tiffs had, therefore, three inflamed spots of irritation, all arising out of the
same factual situation:37 (1) the infringement by defendants of the copy-
righted version of "The Evil Hour"; (2) unfair business practices and un-
fair competition on the part of defendants with reference to the copyrighted
version; and (3) unfair business practices and unfair competition with refer-
ence to the uncopyrighted revision of the play. The Supreme Court held that
spot of irritation (1) arose under the copyright laws, and the district court
bad jurisdiction; spot (2) was a complication furnishing merely additional
grounds for the inflamed condition of spot (1), that it called for the same
poultice ard was, therefore, also within the cognizance of the district court;
but as to spot (3), the court held that that spot did not rest on any federal
ground, was wholly independent of the claim of copyright infringement,
and that the district court was without jurisdiction.
There can be no question but that all three spots should have been poulticed
at the same time; the Court poulticed two and left the third to further
irritation.
We have, therefore, on the one hand the theory "that it is a sound and
desirable thing that all spots of irritation between the parties should be
brought out into the open and should be fought over and disposed of at one
time" reenforced by the experience of courts of general jurisdiction in Eng-
land and in the states for which the Rules were first formulated, and on the
36289 U. S. 238, 53 Sup. Ct. 586 (1933).
37Judge Charles E. Clark, in PROCEEDINGS OF WASHINGTON INSTITUTE (1938) 60,
speaking of counterclaims: "The general philosophy I think is clear. Where it is all
essentially a part of the same factual situation, then it can be tried out without new
grounds of jurisdiction."
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other hand our federal system with its hitherto limited judicial power in the
national government and its corollary of federal courts of limited jurisdiction.
Whether in these momentous times we can limit ourselves to any abstract
theories of divided sovereignty may be open to question; this much is certain:
we must take account of the processes of centralization which have taken
place under the clause of the Constitution which gives Congress power "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes"; of the fact that today it is becoming increasingly
difficult to find anyone in industrial pursuits whose activities cannot be said
to be subject to regulation under that clause; we must take account of the
processes of taxation and benefits which the national government is using for
the purpose of bringing state policies into line with federal policies; of the
fact that in the early days litigation was relatively simple and local in char-
acter, whereas today parties in widely separated communities may be involved
in a factual situation and may have an interest in the subject matter of a
law-suit and in its outcome; and finally, of the fact that if we are to survive
at all as against the enemies of our country, the processes of centralization
may have to continue and even be accelerated in the years ahead of us.
Another important influence is the fact that many of the Rules, particu-
-larly those relating to counterclaims, to class actions and to intervention have
long been applied in the equity practice in the federal courts and unavoidably
equitable doctrines of completeness will follow the application of the Rules
to what were formerly known as actions at law.
Lawyers must of necessity take into account these facts and these ten-
dencies when they are called upon to define the scope of the flexible term
"claim for relief" which the Rules have adopted; when they seek to define
"subject matter" and "subject of the action"-the latter a term which the
New York Court of Appeals has said is "so obscure and general as to justify
the interpretation which shall be found most convenient and best calculated
to promote the ends of justice" ;38 when they attempt to define "transaction
or occurrence" within the meaning of Rule 13 (a) relating to compulsory
counterclaims; and when they are required to determine what is "ancillary"
to the "subject matter" of the action and within the jurisdiction invoked
in the principal action, in the case of third-party claims under Rule 14, and
in interventions under Rule 24.
The influence of the equitable doctrine of completeness is seen in recent
expressions of the courts regarding the scope of jurisdiction as to claims
growing out of a single transaction. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit says of the Rules:
38SNew York, N. H. & H. R.R. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592, 604 (1858).
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"The new rules seek to require in a civil action what has always been
aimed at in an equity suit, that all claims growing out of a single trans-
action be brought in and settled in the one case. Rules 13, 15 (c), 18
(a). That one of them alone may involve less than $3,000 is not an
obstacle if the controversy as a whole involves that much; and jurisdic-
tion once acquired lasts till the court finishes with all parts of the con-
troversy."3
9
A district court has said:
"Equity jurisprudence in the United States has always recognized the
propriety of cross bills, following the rule that a court of equity has
jurisdiction of all cross or counterclaims growing out of and germane
and ancillary to the plaintiff's cause of action, even though they could
not be pleaded as independent suits within federal jurisdiction. To justi-
fy adjudication of a counterclaim, it was only essential that it be of a
character making it necessary to realization of complete justice as to the
subject matter of the original cause of action.
"It was once the rule apparently that new parties could not be brought
in on cross bill, but the equity rules and those now in force did away
with such limitation and expressly provide that new parties may be
brought in." 40
Another district court has said, very generally:
"Whether a case at law be civil or criminal, it is well known that more
truth reaches the surface and better justice is attained, if all related
matters be considered and all involved persons be heard in one and the
same trial. '41
Still another district court has said:
"... the tendency of the courts throughout is that in the aid of justice
and equity once the matter has come before the federal courts and the
question of venue is not one of paramount importance or is not affected,
the jurisdictional requirements are not looked upon as insurmountable
when no great hardship or inequity is inflicted upon those third parties."42
We cannot, of course, consider these expressions critically without looking
at the precise factual situations before the court in each case; at the same
time it is significant that these courts of limited jurisdiction seemed to ex-
perience no difficulty in employing language appropriate to courts of general
jurisdiction intent upon working out complete justice to all parties who might
be involved in a given set of circumstances.
39jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F. (2d) 123, 125 (C. C. A. 5th 1939).
4OCarter Oil Co. v. Wood, 30 F. Supp. 875, 876, 877 (E. D. Ill. 1940).41Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Robinson, 31 F. Supp. 299, 304 (W.
D. La. 1940).42Schram v. Roney, 30 F. Supp. 458, 461 (E. D. Mich. 1939).
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I
The tendency is more marked when we come to Rule 14, Third-Party
Practice. In the early cases in which the federal courts, under favor of
the Conformity Act, applied state third-party practice acts, they looked rather
closely to questions of jurisdiction. In Paner v. Lyons Cafeterias, Inc.,43
plaintiffs sued in a New York court, alleging breach of representation that
food sold in defendant's restaurant was fit for human consumption. Defend-
ant in turn impleaded as a third-party defendant A, a New York corpora-
tion which had sold defendant the food, and A in turn impleaded B, a New
Jersey corporation which had furnished the food to A. B removed the
entire suit to the district court, whereupon the plaintiff moved to remand on
the ground that there was no separable controversy. The court agreed with
plaintiff and remanded the action. It said, in effect, that there was no exist-
ing cause of action on the part of the original defendant, Lyons Cafeterias,
Inc., against A, or on the part of A against B. "At most," so the court
said, "there is a possibility that, as a result of the outcome of the primary
suit, a cause of action may arise. . . . If the- plaintiff should fail against
Lyons, there would be nothing further to litigate."
In Sperry v. Keeler Transportation Co.,44 a suit instituted in a district
court, the court refused to permit the defendant to implead a party, of the
same citizenship as defendant, as a third-party defendant, on the ground
that it lacked jurisdiction of the third-party controversy, that controversy
being between citizens of the same state.
In Lowry & Co. v. National City Bank,45 plaintiff, a Delaware corporation,
sued defendant, a New York corporation, for alleged refusal to pay drafts
drawn pursuant to a letter of credit which defendant had issued. Defendant
moved for leave to implead D, a Delaware corporation, which had agreed
to indemnify defendant for all payments which it might make pursuant to
the letter, and also M, a Louisiana corporation, which had agreed to pay
the debts of D. The district court granted the motion and permitted de-
fendant to implead both D and M on the ground that diversity existed be-
tween defendant and D, and between defendant and M, and that this con-
troversy was entirely independent of that between the original plaintiff and
the original defendant.
These cases illustrate the early attitude of the courts on questions of juris-
diction involved in third-party practice.
Then Rule 14 adapted to federal procedure the practice as it had been
developed in admiralty, under the English orders and under the New York
Civil Practice Act.
4321 F. Supp. 263 (E. D. N. Y. 1937).
4428 F. (2d) 897 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
4528 F. (2d) 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
[Vol. 26
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Some courts have made the general statement that all third-party proceed-
ings are ancillary in character, and that for that reason they present no ques-
tions of jurisdiction;46 others have added that they present no questions of
venue ;47 other courts, while considering questions of jurisdiction foreclosed
by the ancillary character of the proceedings, say that third-party defendants
may still assert the privilege of venue given by statute ;48 others have con-
sidered the questions as debatable and calling for final determihation by
the Supreme Court.49
Three primary situations are possible under Rule 14: (1) the defendant,
third-party plaintiff, claims that the proposed third-party defendant is, or
may be (depending upon plaintiff recovering a judgment against defendant)
liable to defendant for all or part of plaintiff's claim against defendant; (2)
the defendant, third-party plaintiff, claims that the proposed third-party
defendant is liable to plaintiff for all, or for a part of plaintiff's claim, and
that defendant is not liable at all, or not liable for such part; (3) the de-
fendant, third-party plaintiff, claims that if defendant is liable at all to
plaintiff, then the proposed third-party defendant is liable jointly with de-
fendant for all, or for a part of plaintiff's claim against defendant.
In the first situation, that is, where the defendant, third-party plaintiff,
claims that the proposed third-party defendant is, or may be (depending
upon plaintiff recovering a judgment against defendant) liable to defendant
for all or part of plaintiff's claim against defendant, unless the defendant
admits thai he is liable to plaintiff (an admission which will seldom be made),
then defendant's claim against the proposed third-party defendant is con-
tingent upon the plaintiff recovering a judgment against defendant. It has
been said that in this situation, as between the defendant and the proposed
third-party defendant, there is no existing "case" or "controversy" in the
constitutional sense.50 This view is definitely against the weight of authority
46Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Winisle Coal Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (S. D.
W. Va. 1939), mnotion to di, iss third party complaint denied, 29 F. Supp. 90 (S. D.
W. Va. 1939); Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F. Supp. 67 (D. N. J. 1939); Kravas
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939); Bossard v.
McGwinn v. Siegel, 27 F. Supp. 41Z (W. D. Pa. 1939); Seemer v. Ritter, 25 F. Supp. 688
(M. D. Pa. 1938).4 7Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W. D. La. 1940),
motion to dismiss overruled, 32 F. Supp. 335 (W. D. La. 1940) ; Morrell v. United
Air Lines Transport Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (E. D. N. Y.
1939).4 8Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 29 F. Supp.
112 (D. Conn. 1939).49Schram v. Roney, 30 F. Supp. 458 (E. D. Mich. 1939). In Satink v. Holland
Township, supra note 46, the court remarks that "there have developed two schools of
thought in the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure with reference to the joinder
of third-party defendants." 28 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D. N. J. 1939).50See Panzer v. Lyons Cafeterias, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 263 (E. D. N. Y. 1937),
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and against the theory underlying the Declaratory Judgment Act [49 STAT.
1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. A. § 400 (Supp. 1940)].
Can the third-party claim be considered "ancillary" to the main action so
that jurisdiction of the main action supports jurisdiction as to the "ancillary"
third-party claim? It is to be noted that plaintiff's action is directed against
the defendant; he asserts no claim against the third-party defendant; the
controversy between the defendant and the third-party defendant is solely
between them, whether defendant makes his claim upon a contract of in-
demnity insurance, upon some other indemnity contract, upon a right of
contribution or upon an implied warranty. That it will be convenient to
dispose of the third-party claim in the action in which the plaintiff's claim
is litigated is beyond question; that consideration, however, does not dispose
of jurisdictional limitations. A definite extension of the concept of what
is ancillary seems necessary to support jurisdiction as to the third-party
claim; otherwise an independent ground of jurisdiction, such as federal
right or diversity is necessary.
51
With reference to venue, it is to be noted that the situation is very different
from that presented by a counterclaim against a party who is already "in a
court of his own choosing."5 2 The third-party defendant, unlike a plaintiff
against whom a counterclaim is asserted, is not in court at all until he is
brought in by proper service of summons and complaint; original process
being necessary as to him, he should have the benefit of the privileges which
the venue statutes accord.53
The second situation is presented when the defendant, third-party plain-
tiff, claims that the proposed third-party defendant is liable to plaintiff for
all, or for a part of plaintiff's claim, and that defendant is not liable at all,
or not liable for such part. Strictly under this heading come those cases in
which defendant, as third-party plaintiff, tenders to the original plaintiff
another party who, defendant declares, is solely liable to plaintiff;54 if
plaintiff declines to amend so as to state a claim against the third-party
defendant, some courts have dismissed the third-party complaint, remarking
that where the defendant alleges that the sole responsibility is upon the
51On the subject of ancillary jurisdiction see discussion in Lewis v. United Air Lines
Transport Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn. 1939). See also
Barkeij v. Don Lee, Inc. v. Barkeij, 34 F. Supp, 874 (S. D. Cal. 1940) ; Sklar v. Hayes
v. Singer, 1 F. R. D. 415 (E. D. Pa. 1940).52General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U. S. 430, 53 Sup. Ct. 202(1932).5 Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U. S. 222, 56 Sup. Ct. 204 (1935) ; 3 0ELINTGER's FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE (1939) 236-238. See Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp. v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., supra note 51.54Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F. Supp. 67 (D. N. J. 1939). See also Crim v.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. D. C. 1939).
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third-party defendant, that defense can be made by the original defendant
just as well without the presence of the other party. 55
If plaintiff accepts the tender of the third-party defendant as the one
solely liable, then jurisdiction and venue should be determined solely with
reference to that party. If, as is more likely to happen, plaintiff accepts
the tender of the third-party defendant as a joint defendant, or as an alterna-
tive defendant, then the same questions of jurisdiction with reference to the
third-party defendant arise.
The third situation is presented when the defendant, third-party plaintiff,
claims that if defendant is liable at all to the plaintiff, then the proposed
third-party defendant is liable jointly with defendant for all, or for a part
of plaintiff's claim against defendant. More often the defendant, third-party
plaintiff, pleads this as an alternative to what is stated in the second situation.
Some courts have said that the plaintiff may not object that he has no cause
of action against the proposed third-party defendant ;56 others that plaintiff
has no uncontrolled right of election where, under state law, a judgment
against joint tortfeasors is solidary ;57 and that if the defendant pleads a right
of contribution as between the defendant and the third-party defendant
the joinder should be allowed. 58  But has the defendant a right to say that
an action shall be joint which plaintiff elects to make several? Further-
more, may one defendant be thus brought in by another when, if plaintiff
had impleaded him originally, identity of citizenship would have prevented
jurisdiction? Rule 19 (b), in the careful provision it makes for non-joinder
where the presence of a party would oust the jurisdiction of the court, seems
to require a negative answer. If under the state law the proposed third-
party defendant is an indispensable party to the plaintiff's action, then he
must be joined, and it is for the plaintiff to join him as a defendant or
suffer a dismissal of his action.60
If plaintiff refuses to amend, and the defendant's claim against the third-
party defendant is solely for contribution, then, unless this contest is con-
55Satink v. Holland Township, 31 F. Supp. 229 (D. N. J. 1940). It is within the
discretion of the court to refuse leave to make such a party a third-party defendant.
General Taxicab Ass'n v. O'Shea, 109 F, (2d) 671 (App. D. C. 1940).
56Burris v. American Chicle Co., 29 F. Supp. 773 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).57Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W. D. La. 1940),
motion to dismiss overruled, 32 F. Supp. 335 (W. D. La. 1940).58Kravas v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66, 67 (W. D. Pa. 1939)
Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Winisle Coal Co., 29 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S. D.
W. Va. 1939).59This is the reverse of the question which the Supreme Court answered in the nega-
tive in Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 41, 5 Sup. Ct. 1034 (1885). See Thompson v. Moore,
109 F. (2d) 372, 374 (C. C. A. 8th 1940).
60 For dismissal for want of an indispensable party where such party, though allowed
to intervene, files no pleading, see Paasche v. Atlas Powder Co., 31 F. Supp. 31 (N. D.
Ill. 1940).
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sidered broadly as ancillary, it should be supported by an independent juris-
dictional ground.
What has been said of venue in the first situation applies to the situation
now under consideration.
The new problems of jurisdiction and venue have brought divergent an-
swers. One district court has said :61
"There have developed two schools of thought among the courts in
the application of the Rules of Civil Procedure with reference to thejoinder of third party defendants. The cases F. & M. Skirt Company,
Inc. v. A. Wimpfheimer & Bro., Inc., D. C., 27 F. Supp. 239, and
King v. Shepherd et al., D. C., 26 F. Supp. 357, hold that third-party
complaint practice does not extend venue or affect the jurisdictional
requirement of diversity of citizenship. These cases rely upon Rule 82
which provides as follows: 'These rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States or
the venue of actions therein.' To conform with these cases it would be
necessary to conclude that the proposed third-party defendants (the
owner and driver of the automobile) cannot be joined because they are
residents within the same state as plaintiff.
"Seemer v. Ritter, D. C., 25 F. Supp. 688, Crum v. Appalachian
Power Co., D. C., 27 F. Supp. 138, Bossard v. McGwinn, D. C., 27 F.
Supp. 412, and Kravas et al. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., D. C.,
28 F. Supp. 66, are cases adopting a rule contrary to the principles set
forth in the above cases. These cases hold that the third-party claim
does not need independent jurisdictional grounds for support, as the claim
is only ancillary to the primary claim. This reasoning is based upon
ithe fact, inter alia, that Form 22, accompanying the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which relates to third-party complaints, unlike the forms for
original complaints, omits any allegation of jurisdiction."
Another district court says :62
"There is no denying the enthusiasm of those primarily responsible
for Rule 14 in their desire for a bold attitude on the part of courts
towards diminishing multiplicity of suits. With this general proposition
this court is in full sympathy and all decisions of other district courts
up to the present time, tend to substantiate claims of third-party plaintiffs
as we will note herein later. On the other hand, not having the benefit
of any court of appeals' precedent, your district court must satisfy itself
that in being 'bold' it has not transgressed rules of law and direct pro-
visions of the constitution or acts of congress.
"We admit that the question is a close one but it is apparent that the
rule has a tendency to eliminate to some extent multiplicity of suits and
that until this court is bound by precedent of the court of appeals, which
61Satink v. Holland Township, 28 F. Suop. 67, 71 (D. N. J. 1939).62Schram v. Roney, 30 F. Supp. 458, 460, 462 (E. D. Mich. 1939).
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decision may come before this case is actually tried, we will deny the
motion to dismiss."
It' will not do to assert jurisdiction merely on the ground that the third-
party proceeding is "ancillary"; that is merely begging the question; what
is meant by "subject-matter of the principal action"? How broad is the
term? How is "ancillary" to be defined? No one questions the desirability
of summoning into court all parties who may be involved in a certain factual
situation and bringing out all spots of irritation and taking care of them in
one action-but if this requires an extension of jurisdiction and a change
in the rules of venue, let us say so frankly, and not by rationalization make
a dead letter of Rule 82.63
Rule 2 says that "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action'." The temple of federal justice was originally constructed with a
partition extending from the foundation to the roof. On one side was a
chamber labelled "law" and on the other side a chamber marked "equity."
There was no opening in the partition and not even the most astute lawyer
could penetrate it. If he found himself in the wrong chamber his case was
dismissed, he was compelled to make his exit, and then from the outside
enter the proper chamber.
After this awknvard arrangement had continued for more than a hundred
years the Act of March 3, 1915, c. 90 [38 STAT. 956] made an opening in
this partition; then on September 16, 1938, the Rules removed the partition
altogether, so that there is now only one chamber in which are accommo-
dated all causes and issues which were formerly designated as being at law
or in equity, respectively.
What effect has this alteration in the building upon the right of trial
by jury?
Plainly it cannot restrict the right; Amendment VII, the Enabling Act,
and Rule 38 prevent such a result. But is the right of trial by jury the
same as it was before, or has it been enlarged?
The logic of the situation answers that it has been enlarged. In the first
place, Rule 38 (b) allows a party to demand a trial by jury of any issue
triable of right by a jury.
But more important than this, remedies and procedures which were for-
merly available only in equity are now available in all civil actions, making
recourse to the special remedies and procedures of equity unnecessary.
Formerly equity took cognizance of an action on behalf of a single com-
plainant against a number of defendants, although there was no common
63See discussion of enlargement of the term "ancillary" in Lewis v. United Air Lines
Transport Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 51.
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title nor community of right or interest in the subject matter among such
defendants, provided there was a community of interest among them in
the questions of law and fact involved in the general controversy. 4 Rule 20
now permits such joinder in all civil actions. Formerly a stockholder suing
on behalf of his corporation could have relief only in a court of equity;65
Rule 23 now makes the device of the class action available generally.
In Thompson v. Central Ohio R.R.,0 6 two railroad companies sued in an
Ohio court to recover upon drafts drawn by a shipper, Thompson, in favor
of Robinson, cashier, in payment for charges for transportation. Robinson
had no interest in the drafts, the real party in interest being the railroad
companies which had performed the transportation service. The Ohio Code
of Civil Procedure, in force at that time, had abolished the distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity, and required that every action be prose-
cuted "in the name of the real party in interest." Defendant Thompson
removed the action to theUnited States Circuit Court, and there the plain-
tiff railroad companies amended their petition to a bill in equity on the
ground that as the nominal legal title in the drafts was in the payee, Robin-
son, the companies could not proceed at law and continue plaintiffs on the
record, and were, therefore, obliged to change the case from an action at
law to a suit in equity. The Circuit Court rendered a decree in favor of
plaintiffs, and from this decree defendant appealed. The court pointed out
that the "real party in interest" provision of the Ohio Code constituted
"a title to sue"; that the sole test of equity jurisdiction was the absence of
a plain and adequate remedy at law; that the "real party in interest" pro-
vision of the Ohio Code gave an adequate remedy at law, and that by enter-
taining the action as a suit in equity the court had deprived the defendant
of his constitutional right of trial by jury.
The same may be said of the procedural devices which the Rules now make
available in all actions; there is no longer need of recourse to equity in the
case of multiple parties or class actions; and the issues in a suit which
could formerly be entertained only in equity are now, as of right, triable
by a jury, and the remedy of trial by jury is correspondingly enlarged.
In the leading case of American Mills Company v. American Surety Coin-
pany,6 the Mills Company had sued the Surety Company in a state court
upon a contract of guaranty. The Surety Company then brought suit in a
court of another state for the cancellation of the contract for fraud. This
latter action was removed to a federal court, and in that court the defendant
6 4 Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244 (1903).65United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U. S. 261, 37 Sup.
Ct. 509 (1917).666 Wall. 134, 18 L. ed. 765 (U. S. 1867).
67260 U. S. 360, 43 Sup. Ct. 149 (1922).
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Mills Company pleaded as a defense that the Surety Company had an ade-
quate remedy for its alleged claim of fraud by defending the suit which it
had brought to collect upon the contract; the Mills Company further pleaded
the contract of guaranty and prayed judgment thereon. The Supreme Court
held that Equity Rule 30, which provided that "the answer must state in
short and simple form any counterclaim arising out of the transaction which
is the subject matter of the suit," related only to an equitable counterclaim,
and that the Mills Company, by pleading its legal counterclaim, which it was
not required to do under the Rule, and by offering evidence in support of
it, waived (1) its objection that the Surety Company had an adequate
remedy at law, and (2) its right of trial by jury.
Since Rule 13 (a), Compulsory Counterclaims, requires a party, under
certain conditions, to state as a counterclaim "any claim, not the subject of a
pending action, which at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has against
any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim," it is clear, under the
authority of the American Mills Company case, that he does not waive his
right of trial by jury by pleading a legal counterclaim to a claim of equitable
cognizance.
But does a party waive his right of trial by jury when to an equitable
claim he pleads, as a permissive counterclaim, a claim at law? The decision
in the American Mills Company case would require an affirmative answer;
and so would the weight of state authorities. There are, however, strong
arguments against this conclusion, the most cogent being that it cannot be
the purpose of the Rules to permit unlimited joinder of claims and to en-
courage parties "to bring out in the open all points of difference and spots of
irritation between them," only at the price of surrendering a valuable right.
In any event, the opposing party may not, because a legal counterclaim has
been pleaded to his equitable action, be deprived of his right of trial by jury
as to the legal counterclaim.
The reconciliation of the theory of our federal system with the practical
ideal of complete justice, in one action, between all parties who may be
involved in any factual situation, rests ultimately with the Supreme Court.
In the meantime it is for us, in the face of totalitarian aggression, so to
mobilize our resources, human as well as material, that the decision may be
freely made in the tradition of English and American institutions.
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CORRELATION OF STATE BLUE SKY LAWS AND
THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS*
THOMAS Z. WRIGHTt
Since the enactment of the federal Securities Act1 in 1933 over seven years
have passed, during which time the eyes of the nation and of those interested
in so called "Blue Sky" legislation have been on that act and its administra-
tion by the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The Blue Sky or securities acts of the various states2 practi-
cally have been forgotten by the legal writers, the bar associations and the
Commissioners on Uniform Laws. This was unfortunate because the states,
*This article was prepared and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for a graduate degree in law at Yale University.'
tThe writer gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Professor A. E. Throop,
Yale Law School, who read the manuscript and offered suggestions thereon.
148 STAT. 74-92 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77a-77aa (1935).2All states except Nevada have some form of Blue Sky legislation.
The Blue Sky laws of the states have been described and classified many times, but
to do so again may not be excessive repetition. These state acts generally can be briefly
described and classified as follows:
a. "FRAUD" type-providing penalties and injunctive action for fraud. The acts of
Delaware, New Jersey and New York may be said to be examples of this type.
b. LAWS CONTROLLING DEALERS ONLY-providing for registration or licensing of
dealers, revocation of such licenses for stated reasons, and other means of enforce-
ment. The acts of Connecticut, Maine, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island are funda-
mentally of this type.
c. LAWS CONTROLLING SECURITIES ONLY-providing that securities shall be qualified
or registered before being sold but not providing that dealers shall be licensed.
The acts of Wyoming and New Mexico are perhaps the only remaining examples
of this type.
d. LAWS CONTROLLING BOTH SECURITIES AND DEALERS:
1. Those requiring registration by notification before sale of securities and the
licensing or registration of dealers. The securities act of Massachusetts is an
example of this type.
2. Those requiring registration by qualification before sale of securities and the
licensing or registration of dealers. The acts of Illinois and Indiana are exam-
ples of this type.
3. Those requiring registration by notification or qualification before sale of securi-
ties and the licensing or registration of dealers. The Minnesota, Wisconsin, and
Kentucky acts are of this type.
State acts controlling both securities and dealers are now the most prevalent type. For
other classifications of the state Blue Sky acts, see Osgood, The Trend of Blue Sky Laws
(1932) 3 INVESTMENT BANKING 144, 147; Smith, State Blue Sky Laws and the Federal
Securities Act (1936) 34 MIcH. L. Rav. 1135, 1137-38; PROCEEDINGS, 2 1 ST ANNUAL
CONVENTION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION SECURITIES CommIssloNERs (1938) 89-90.
SSee the remarks of S. M. Heilbron, Securities Commissioner of Pennsylvania, PRO-
CEEDINGS, 19TH ANNUAL CONVENTION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES Com,-s-
STONEIZS (1936) 69, 84-85, charging that the American Bar Association did not make
the enactment of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act by the states the interest or purpose
of any committee after the act had been adopted in 1929 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform Laws. The Uniform Sale of Securities Act has been adopted
with minor modifications in only three states, Florida (1931), Oklahoma (1931), and
Louisiana (1940). Little consideration has been given the suggested uniform statute
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finding that the federal act did not supersede or derogate from the powers
and activities of their commissions, 4 but instead had for its purpose the secur-
ing of full disclosure of all material facts for the guidance of investors, did
not voluntarily abandon Blue Sky activities or even withdraw from the inter-
state field. There were numerous problems under the state acts which
needed solution when the federal act was passed, many of which still remain
with us. The enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, and the amendments
thereto contained in the Exchange Act of 1934,5 meant that so far as its
terms provided there was an additional regulation governing the distribu-
tion of securities in interstate commerce or through the mails, an additional
law superimposed upon the laws of the various states, to which issuers and
underwriters were already subjected. This naturally raised new problems,
chief of which was the correlation of these various Blue Sky acts of the
forty-seven states and the federal Securities Acts6 so as not to burden unduly
legitimate business, yet provide maximum protection to the investors and
maximum efficiency to the taxpayers of the nation.
I. SUGGESTIONS FOR CORRELATION
Soon after the enactment of the Securities Act the state commissioners
through their national association began efforts to cooperate with the federal
administration. 7 Though their efforts went more to cooperation than corre-
lation, their activities in this behalf resulted in some noteworthy accomplish-
ments, such as the creation of the securities violation records of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission8 and an attempt to spread the use of uniform
registration forms among the states.9
In addition to the National Association of Securities Commissioners, a
few legal writers during the intervening years have seen the need for correla-
tion of the various state Blue Sky acts and the federal Securities Acts and
have developed concrete ideas thereon. One writer in 1936 made a detailed
since amendments thereto were effected by the Conference in its 1930 meeting. The
act is no longer adequate in many respects since it contains no specific provisions on
problems raised by investment counsel and the issuance of whiskey certificates and oil
royalties.4Section 18, Securities Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77r (1935).5Title II, Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 78a (1935).
GMr. A. G. Davis, Field Secretary of the Investment Bankers Association of America,
in a communication to the writer under date of April 22, 1940, stated:
% . . There is no more important project now in the field of security regulation than
that concerning the correlation of the state Blue Sky laws and the Federal Securities
Acts. .. ."7 PROCEEDINGS, 19TH ANNUAL CONVENTIoN NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF SECuRITIEs
CoMmissIoNERs (1936) 103-104.8See note 99 infra.
QSee note 109 infra.
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analysis of the jurisdiction of the states, the purposes of the state acts, and
reasons for correlation. He came to the conclusion that "Issuers and under-
writers must, . . .in order to gain relief from the burden of state require-
ments, address themselves to the task of inducing Congress to remove section
18 from the Securities Act and section 28(a) from the Securities Exchange
Act, and substituting therefor declarations that the federal laws are to be
deemed complete and exclusive, and to the task of inducing the various state
legislatures to revise their securities laws to mitigate excessive and unneces-
sary burdens."' 0
In 1937, Professor Allen E. Throop, then General Counsel for the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, addressed the National Association of
Securities Commissioners on this problem." Professor Throop raised new
problems of substantive law for correlation but did not suggest that the
states' jurisdiction in interstate transactions should be withdrawn. He sug-
gested that a common program be developed which would most "effectively
and most simply integrate state and federal regulation in the achievement of
the policy of investor-protection which each state has heretofore expressed."' 2
It is the purpose of this article to consider the so called Blue Sky acts of
the various states, reasons and suggestions which have been advanced for
effecting their correlation with the federal acts, the progress already made in
the field13 and finally what now should be done toward further carrying out
such a program.
II. SHOULD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EXCLUSIVELY OCCUPY
THE INTERSTATE FIELD?
Under the federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce and the mails
Congress has fully occupied the field of public offerings of securities through
those mediums. Also, Congress has to a considerable extent entered the field
of security qualification where there is no public offering of a new issue
involved by providing for registration of national securities exchanges,' 4
'
0 Smith, supra note 2, at 1135. In a subsequent article this same writer also stated,
.. duplicative requirements of state laws might appropriately be eliminated, and
this could most easily be accomplished by Congressional action to the effect that, so
far as transactions comprehended by the Federal Act are concerned, the state laws
should be inapplicable." Smith, The Relation of Federal and State Securities Laws(1937) 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 241, 254.
"Throop, Coordinate Administration of Federal and State Securities Laws in PRo-
CEEDINGs, 20TH ANNUAL CONVENTION NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF SECuRITIEs CoMMIs-
SiONERS (1937) 90.
121d. at 100.
'3Research on the provisions of the state and federal acts and the rules, regulations and
forms adopted thereunder has been carried up to Sept. 1, 1940.
'
4Section 6, Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 885 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 78f (1935).
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the securities listed and sold thereon,' 5 and the registration of brokers and
Oealers who make use of the mails or instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce to effect transactions in or to induce the purchase or sale of securities
other than on a national securities exchange. 16
A. Benefits of the State Acts
The suggestion for correlation of the state and federal regulations by
eliminating state Blue Sky jurisdiction on interstate issues raises the all
important question of whether there is any continued need for the state
laws, or any real purpose to be served by their continuance. It is recognized
that laws which are intended to stop bad practices also regulate legitimate
business and constitute a burden on that business. To the extent these laws
impose a burden without a contributing benefit they are a handicap rather
than a boon to business. The extent to which state Blue Sky laws consti-
tute a burden on legitimate business will be considered shortly, but first let
us deter'mine to what extent they constitute a benefit to the investing public.
Their present value should not be weighed before determining this factor.
1. Determination of Quality Function.-Most of the argument of those
desiring to eliminate state jurisdiction over interstate issues seems to be
predicated upon the theory that the policies of the state acts are not to deter-
mine for investors the "soundness" of the securities offered for registration,
refusing to permit the sale of those not meeting the standards set by the local
acts, but rather that their policies are to require adequate disclosure of facts
to the investing public to the end that fraud may be prevented. 7  If this be
true the state acts are merely duplicating the work of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 in so far as issue registration require-
ments are concerned, and if we desire to eliminate that duplication it will
be necessary to choose between the two systems. This theory is not borne
out, however, by the provisions of the state acts regulating registration of
securities or the decisions arising thereunder.' 8 In fact, there is no doubt,
'
5 Section 12, Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 892 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A.§ 781 (1935), as amended by 49 STAT. 1375 (1936), 15 U. S. C. A. § 781 (Supp. 1939).
'
6 Section 15, Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 78o (1935), as amended by 49 STAT. 1377 (1936), and 52 STAT. 1075 (1938); 15
U. S. C. A. § 78o (Supp. 1939).
17 Smith, supra note 2, at 1162-63.
'
81n Investment Reserve Corporation v. Michigan Securities Commission, 238 Mich.
606, 214 N. W. 311 (1927), it was sought to secure a reversal of an order of the state
commission denying an application to sell proposed investment bonds in a newly organ-
ized company with few assets, no investments, an untried plan of operations, and large
selling expenses to be deducted from the investors' first payments. The Michigan statute
provided that "the right to sell securities in this state shall not be granted in any case
where it appears to the commission that the sale of such securities would work a fraud,
deception or imposition on purchasers or the public, or that the proposed disposal of
the securities is on unfair terms." Section 12, Michigan Blue Sky Law. Mich. Pub.
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in view of the many express provisions in these acts' 9 and the cases which
have arisen thereunder,20 tht their fundamental purpose is to require that
the "soundness" and quality of the securities be passed upon.
This being true, it follows that the state Blue Sky acts have a very definite
place in the field of security regulation. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission does not purport to pass upon the quality of the securities being
offered, its only duties being to see that a full disclosure of all facts has
been made in the registration statement and that the prospectus meets the
requirements of Section 10 of the Act. Thus, the federal commission forces
a full disclosure of all material facts and the state commissions, on the basis
of this disclosure,' pass upon the quality of the securities,2 2 the two or-
ganizations forming a complete plan of security sales regulation on inter-
state distributions.
Acts 1923, Act No. 220, as amended by Pub. Acts 1929, Act No. 136, Pub. Acts 1931,
Act No. 255 and Pub. Acts 1935, Act No. 37. In sustaining the decision of the com-
mission the court said, "This commission is composed of members appointed for their
experience in financial affairs, ... some weight is to be given to the special qualifica-
tions and experience of the commission in passing on testimony relating to the feasibility
and fairness of such untried financial enterprises as proposed here .... [The] theoretical
mathematical solution of the scheme does not relieve the proposed contract bonds of
their unfair features, or the elements of uncertainty, potential constructive fraud and
imposition on the public found by the commission." It seems certain in this case that
the decision of the state commission was based, not upon any failure to disclose facts,
but upon the uncertainty of the issuer's future and the small likelihood of its success.
In a similar case, Hayden Plan v. Friedlander, 97 Cal. App. 12, 275 Pac. 253 (1929),
arising under the California act, the court said, " ... the plan was untried and purely
experimental; it was an innovation in modern financing. That fact alone would war-
rant a close scrutiny, and could be and doubtless was considered by the Commissioner
in determining his action. The Corporate Securities Act was enacted for the purpose
of protecting the general public, not only against fraudulent or unlawful stock schemes
or enterprises, but likewise to give to the state authority to regulate and control the
class and characer of securities or investments that might be offered to the public for
purchase. . . ." It seems evident that in California the purposes of its act are more
than requiring a disclosure of facts. (Italics are the author's.)
19 Notice also Section 8 (cc) of the Indiana Securities Law [H. B. 374, Ind. Laws
19373, denying registration if it be found that the business of the issuer is based upon
"unsound business principles."
2 0Doble Steam Motors Corp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158, 232 Pac. 140 (1924);
State v. Kerr Hull Co., 178 Minn. 623, 228 N. W. 162 (1929); State v. Hardstone
Brick Co., 174 Minn. 200, 219 N. W. 81 (1928). Cf., In re Investors Syndicate, 147 Minn.
217, 179 N. W. 1001 (1920).
21This statement assumes a correlation of registration requirements hereafter to be
suggested.22 1t is the writer's belief that such paternalism on the part of the states is necessary
to protect many investors. The federal prospectus, containing a mass of material in-
formation, is quite sufficient for the protection of the skilled investor who can and
will read it, understand it, and act thereon for his own protection. But much of the
technical and accounting information contained in the federal prospectus cannot be
fully appreciated by lay individuals and the very size of the document often discourages
the prospective investor until he makes no attempt to comprehend the "full disclosure"
tendered him. Unless we are ready to say such investors either should not be given
protection or that they should not be permitted to make investments in securities offered
the public, it is necessary to recognize that to protect such purchasers the states must
continue to eliminate, so far as possible, the unfair and fraudulent issues.
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2. Regulation of Purchases of Intangible Properties and Expenses of
Securities Sales.-It is common for state Blue Sky acts to provide for placing
in escrow any of the securities proposed to be registered, or securities senior
thereto, which have been or which are to be issued for intangible assets by
the issuer.22 ' The statutes vary with respect to the requirements to be met
before the escrowed securities may be released. The Florida Securities Act
requires that the escrow agreement provide that the owner of such securi-
ties shall not be entitled to withdraw them from escrow until all other stock-
holders who paid for their stock in cash shall have been paid an actual earned
dividend or dividends aggregating not less than six per cent, and in case of
dissolution or insolvency during the escrow period that the owners of such
escrowed securities shall not participate in the assets until after the owners
of all other securities shall have been paid in full.23 Furthermore, it is common
for the state acts to limit sales expense when the distribution is to be made
through agents and there is no binding firm commitment to purchase the
issue by an underwriter. The Illinois act provides that if the issue is to be
sold through agents the issuer must receive not less than 80% of the pro-
ceeds of each sale,2 1- while the California act simply provides that the State
Commissioner may impose 'conditions limiting the expense in connection
with the sale but puts no express limits upon his discretion.25 The federal
registration statement requires the issuer to show the amount of such selling
expense20 and reveal the purchase of any intangible properties within two
years preceding the filing of the registration statement from any promoter,
director, principal executive officer, stockholder (holding more than 10%
of any class or in the aggregate of the stock of the issuer) or parties to a
material contract made outside the ordinary course of business of the
issuer. 7 Here again the purposes of the federal and state acts tie together.
The Securities and Exchange Commission can force a full disclosure of all
the material facts and the state commissions, on the basis of this disclosure,
may require securities issued for intangible properties to be placed in esdrow
and may refuse to register the securities for sale if the selling expenses thereon
are too high.
3. Impounding Proceeds of Issue Pending Its Successful Completion.-
22 Heilbron, supra note 3, at 70-72.23Section 14, Florida Securities Act. Florida Laws 1931, c. 14, p. 899.24Section 9, Illinois Securities Act. Ill. Laws 1919, p. 351, as amended by H. B. 971,
Laws 1931, S. B. 628, Laws 1933, and S. B. 225, Laws 1935.25Section 4, California Corporate Securities Act. Cal. Laws 1917, c. 532, as amended
by Laws 1931, c. 434, § 3, Laws 1933, c. 898, § 2, and Laws 1935, c. 166, § 3.2 Gltems 25, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, Registration Statement A-i, Securities and Exchange
Commission.27Items 25, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, Registration State-
ment A-1, Securities and Exchange Commission.
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In a few states provisions are made either by statute or rule that the
commission may in its discretion require funds raised by a sale of stock to
be impounded until the minimum capital required for incorporation, 28 or the
amount deemed necessary to successfully finance the-proposed corporation,2 9
or the amount needed to provide adequate working capital3 ° or finance pro-
posed expansions 8 ' has been secured. This seems to be an excellent way to
handle certain doubtful issues when they are not underwritten, whether they
arise in interstate or intrastate transactions. Furthermore, when the investor
purchases stock in a corporation thinking it is to carry on business in a
certain manner, or make certain expansions, and insufficient funds are raised
to permit that contemplated action, a situation is created where the protection
provided under the Securities Act of 1933 is hardly adequate. The most
that the Securities and Exchange Commission can do in this case is require
the issuer to state in detail the specific purposes for which the total proceeds
were or are to be used, the use to which the actual net proceeds from the
securities registered will be put if insufficient funds are raised to accomplish
those purposes and if at any time it is found undesirable to proceed with the
program. 32 Thus the investor will be informed of proposed alternative action,
but in most instances he will have invested to promote the primary purposes,
giving little or no thought to any other course of action. It is believed that
in this instance such state provisions, providing for a return of the purchaser's
funds if the capital raising program miscarries or if it is found undesirable
to proceed with the stated purposes, provide better protection for investors than
do the requirements of the Securities Act alone.
4. State Exemptions of "Listed" Securities.-It has been argued that
inasmuch as the states, by their provisions exempting from registration
securities listed upon certain exchanges 33 and, in some states, securities prior
28Section 7, Texas Securities Act. H. B. 521, Tex. Laws 1935.29Alabama, Rule 3, Sec. 1 [131 C. C. H. 153-54 (1940)], and Ohio Regulation R63
[131 C. C. H. 3356 (1940)].30Alabama, Rule 3, Sec. 2 [131 C. C. H. 154 (1940)], and Ohio Regulation Q-1
[131 C. C. H. 3358 (1940)].
SlAlabama, Rule 3, Sec. 3 [131 C. C. H. 154 (1940)].32Items 42 and 43 of Registration Statement A-0-1 and Item 27 of Registration State-
ment A-1, Securities and Exchange Commission. Each of these items is carried over into
the federal prospectus.
In the Matter of the Winnebago Distilling Co., Securities Act Release No. 2188, Feb.
26, 1940, the Securities and Exchange Commission entered a stop order because the
answer to Item 27 of the registrant's registration statement was materially defective.
In that case the Commission said, ". . . In our opinion, regard for the interests of
investors required full and clear disclosure of the specific purposes for which registrant
intended to employ its funds in the event only $150,000 were received, and of the use
that would be made of the funds contributed by stockholders in the event that a mini-
mum of $150,000 were not obtained."38 For a survey of the extent of such exemption in the state acts see 132 C. C. H.
6507-6516 (1940).
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thereto,3 4 have recognized that adequate investor protection is secured when
information as to the financial affairs of the issuer is made available,
the states can with equal propriety extend an exemption to securities
registered under the Securities Act of 1933.- Since the passage of the
Exchange Act in 1934 it has been suggested that the states might very
well extend their exemption of securities listed on certain stated ex-
changes, and securities senior thereto, to include all securities listed upon
registered national securities exchanges and unlisted securities senior there-
to.36 It is true that many of the evils of this exemption have been eliminated
by requiring in effect the same financial information listing requirements
on all registered exchanges,38 but there are good arguments for narrowing
this exemption rather than expanding it.39
31For a list of states granting an exemption to securities prior to listed securities see
Smith, supra note 10, at 247 n.; 132 C. C. H. 6507-6516 (1940).
35Smith, supra note 10, at 255. This argument, however, fails to recognize that the
states in granting the exchange exemption have not recognized exactly that adequate
investor protection is secured when information as to the financial affairs of the issuer is
made available. In truth the listing of a stock for trading upon an exchange generally
requires a finding by the committee on listing as to the quality of the security, and the
sufficiency of its distribution. Under the listing requirements of the New York Stock
Exchange [135 C. C. H. 8216 (1940)], the applicant must show that it is a going
concern, or the successor to a going concern, and must have substantial assets or demon-
strated earning power, or both. The committee considers the applicant's standing in
its particular field, the character of the market for its products, its relative stability
and position in its industry, and whether or not it is engaged in an expanding industry
with prospects of maintaining its position. Generally, however, the listing requirements
of some of the smaller exchanges have not been so rigid as those of the New York
Stock Exchange. See note 43 infra, for a consideration of the distribution requirements
for listing.36Heilbron, supra note 3, at 90.37The exchange exemption has been used many times in the past to escape state
Blue Sky laws. The exemption was not always limited to the New York Stock Ex-
change where fairly adequate listing requirements were maintained but often included
smaller exchanges over the country, particularly any located in the state in question,
where often inadequate listing requirements were maintained. See THE SEcuRIrY MAR-
xzTrs (Twentieth Century Fund 1935) 236-37, 257-59; Sibal, The Securities Act of 1933,
as amended (Unpublished thesis Yale Law School 1935). Thus, in many instances it
was easier to list the securities with some small exchange than to qualify them for sale
under a complicated state act. Steig, What Can the Regulatory Securities Act Accom-
plish? (1933) 31 MIcHr. L. REv. 775, 779-80. Furthermore, the market price on such
exchanges offered no investor protection for it was generally maintained by the under-
writers or selling group until the distribution was completed. PRoCEEDINGS, 19TH
ANNUAL CONVENTION NATIONAL AssoCIATIoN SEcURITIES CommISsIoNERS (1936) 173.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 2446, by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, however, for a recent discussion of this stabilizing problem and rules
promulgated by the Commission under Section 9 (a) (6) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78i (1935).3SSection 12, Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 892 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 781 (1935), as amended by 49 STAT. 1375 (1936), 15 U. S. C. A. § 781 (Supp. 1939).391t also has been suggested that the exchange exemption should be extended to in-
clude securities which have been recommended for listing upon their issuance, by the
listing committee of a designated exchange even before they are actually issued. See
Smith, supra note 2, at 1165, for a development of this argument.
On the other hand, if the exchange exemption is consistent with the principles of
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An analysis of the value of the exchange exemption requires separate
considerations of its use in pr'imary and in secondary distributions of securi-
ties. There are many arguments and reasons why the exchange exemption
should not be available for use on an original primary distribution of
securities. As has been previously pointed out,40 the listing requirements of
the exchanges generally require findings by their committees on listing con-
cerning the quality of the securities, although these requirements have not
been uniform and those of the smaller exchanges have not been so rigid as
those of the New York Stock Exchange. In view of this laxity on the part
of some of the exchanges it is doubtful if listings generally give investor
protection equivalent to that given by the state Blue Sky commissions from
the standpoint of a determination of the quality and "soundness" of the securi-
ties. Furthermore, there is the danger that listing committees of small ex-
6hanges needing business will not exercise the same degree of care and
prudence in passing upon the quality of securities as do the securities com-
missioners of the various states whose primary purpose is the protection of
investors. Also, the previously considered state provisions limiting sales
expense, requiring the placing in escrow of all shares, or securities prior
thereto, given or to be given for intangible properties, and those provisions
impounding the proceeds of security issues pending the success of their
distributions, have no counterparts in the Securities Act of 1933 or the
Exchange Act of 1934. These provisions serve useful and desirable func-
tions, and their value must be weighed against the value of the exchange
listing exemption when it is used to escape state registrations on original
primary distributions of securities. The final argument against the use of
the exchange exemption in such an instance does not concern any loss of
protection under the Blue Sky acts but rather the impropriety of permitting
securities to be listed and dealt in upon any exchange until there is a sufficient
distribution of the issue to make a market. The Exchange Act of 1934 author-
ized the Securities and Exchange Commission to request any national securi-
ties exchange to limit or prohibit the registration of, or trading in, any
security within a specified period after the issuance or primary distribution
thereof. If the exchange did not comply with the request, the Commission
was authorized to effect the change by its own regulations. 41 In 1937 the
"qualification" of securities involved in most state Blue Sky laws because the exchanges,
on the whole, have purported to pass upon the quality of the securities before listing, then
it may be questioned if the exemption is a proper delegation of authority to a non-govern-
mental agency. In most instances it constitutes a delegation of authority to exchanges
operating entirely outside the states in question and owing not the slightest allegiance
or duties to those states. Throop, supra note 11, at 96; Steig, loc. cit. supra note 37.40See supra inote 35.4 t Section 19 (b) (2), Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 48 STAT. 898 (1934), 15
U. S. C. A. § 78s (1935).
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Commission reported that it was making a study of this problem,4 2 but a
review of the listing requirements of the registered national securities ex-
changes shows few express rules on the problem, most of which are more
or less inadequate. 43 In view of the superior investor protection afforded
by the state Blue Sky laws and the impropriety of permitting securities to be
listed and dealt in upon any exchange until there is a sufficient distribution
of the issue to make an adequate market, the advisability of permitting the
exchange exemption to be used any time during an original primary dis-
tribution of an issue is very doubtful.
Slightly different considerations are involved if the problem concerns a
primary distribution of an unissued portion of an issue previously distributed
to the public and listed and dealt in upon a registered national securities
exchange. In this instance there should be a sufficient distribution of the
securities originally issued to make an adequate market; but the superior
investor protection afforded by the state Blue Sky laws in passing upon the
quality of the securities, regulating sales expense and the purchase of in-
tangible properties, and impounding the proceeds of the newly issued securi-
ties pending the success of their distribution, still makes it doubtful that the
exchange exemption should be permitted to operate at all during the primary
distribution of an issue.
The state acts generally do not exempt secondary distributions of securi-
ties, whether interstate or intrastate.4 The securities in such instances like-
wise generally may become exempt by being listed upon an exchange. The
42T rav ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECUUTIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1937) 72.
4 3 The stock listing requirements of the registered national securities exchanges can
be found in 135 C. C. H. 8001-8353 (1940). The rules of most of the exchanges in-
cluding those of Cincinnati, Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Francisco, and the Chicago
Board of Trade require only a showing of the distribution of an issue, leaving it to
the judgment of the listing committee whether that distribution is sufficient to justify
the granting of trading privileges. The Baltimore Stock Exchange requires this in-
formation only "on request." 135 C. C. H. 8005 (1940). The Boston Stock Exchange
does not require a complete distribution but will grant listed trading privileges when
"the security has been sufficiently distributed to the public to afford reasonable assurance
of a free market for it." 135 C. C. H. 8011 (1940). The rules of the Chicago Stock
Exchange contain a similar provision. The San Francisco Mining Exchange requires
only that 15% of the capital stock be distributed to the public, exclusive of officers,
directors, syndicate managers and agents. 135 C. C. H. 8312 (1940). The Washington
Stock Exchange requires a statement of the number of authorized shares issued and
outstanding and a statement of the number of shareholders, "which must in no case
be less than twenty-five (25)." 135 C. C. H. 8345 (1940). The New York Stock
Exchange, however, requires that the security be actually issued, outstanding and be
sufficiently widely distributed to offer reasonable assurance that an adequate auction
market will exist. 135 C. C. H. 8216-8256 (19-40).4 4The state acts generally do provide, however, that an isolated sale by a bona fide
owner shall be an exempt transaction. Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, Act No. 220, § 5 (c), as
amended by Mich. Pub. Acts 1929, Act No. 136, Mich. Pub. Acts 1935, Act No. 37;
Ohio Laws 1929, Sec. 8624-4, S. B. No. 12, as amended by H. B. No. 794, 2d Spec.
Sess. 1937-38.
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registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, on the other hand, do
not apply to a secondary distribution of securities45 unless it is by an affiliate
of the issuer or a person in a control relationship with the issuer within
the terms of the last sentence of Section 2(11) of the Act. It is quite evi-
dent in this instance that the framers of the act recognized that a party
making a secondary distribution, unless in the specified control relationship
with the issuer, would be unable generally to secure the issuer's cooperation
in the preparation and filing of a registration statement and prospectus.
Therefore to prevent the freezing of large blocks of securities in the hands
of individuals and corporations the act was drafted to exempt secondary
distributions in such instances.
The opponents of the state Blue Sky laws can make a good argument that
the state acts likewise should exempt secondary distributions when made
for or on behalf of a party not an affiliate of the issuer or a person in a
control relationship with the issuer, because of the practical difficulties in-
herent in effecting a registration by such person, the probable inadequacy
of any registration thus effected, and the public interest in not hampering
the free interchange of outstanding securities in bona fide transactions.
Furthermore, in these cases there is less public interest in regulating sales
expense and no necessity to impound the proceeds of the distribution pend-
ing its successful completion, both of which are important functions of the
state acts. Also, it is to be noted that in most cases considerable investor
protection will be given by the operation of the federal acts. Unless the
security is one exempt by the provisions of Section 3 of the Securities Act
of 1933 or issued in a transaction not involving any public offering 6 there
will be on file the original registration statement and prospectus, and all
amendments thereto, used during the primary distribution of the issue. 47
Of course, the civil liability provisions of Section 12(2) of the Act apply to
45A secondary distribution is not exempt from the provisions of Section 5 of the
Act, however, until one year after the date the securities are bona fide offered to the
public, assuming the secondary distribution does not consist of the dealer's original
allotment, and provided it is by a person who did not purchase from the issuer "with
a view to the distribution" of the securities. Furthermore, this is assuming that the
secondary distribution is not effected by or for the issuer. See Section 4 (1) and Sec-
tion 2 (11) of the Securities Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended by 48
STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77d (1935) ; 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A.§ 77b (1935). For a discussion of secondary distributions under the Securities Act
of 1933 see Throop and Lane, Some Problems of Exemption. under the Securities Act
of 1933 in (1937) 4 LAw & Cox'rEmP. PROB. 116-119.46Section 4 (1), Securities Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT.
906 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77d (1935).
471f the occasion arose the purchasers could take advantage of the civil liability pro-
visions of Section 11 of the Securities Act. In most such secondary distributions, how-
ever, the limitations of actions provisions of Section 13 would prevent recovery. 48
STAT. 82 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 907 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77k (1935) ; and
48 STAT. 84 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 908 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77n (1935).
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either primary or secondary distributions. In many instances the securities
being offered in a secondary distribution may be listed for trading upon
some national securities exchange and registered under the provisions of the
Exchange Act of 1934. Thus, considerable investor protection will be
afforded by the federal acts in most secondary distributions. It would facili-
tate the free interchange of outstanding securities if the states would recog-
nize the practical difficulties inherent in a registration of the securities in a
secondary distribution for or on behalf of a party not affiliated with the
issuer or in a control relationship with the issuer, and grant an exemption
for those transactions. The exchange exemption is not an advantage to
the unaffiliated party in such a case if the securities have not been listed
previously, as he is in no position to secure their listing upon an exchange.
If the states graAted absolute exemption to such secondary distributions it
would result in a loss of some investor protection; but in view of the
registration difficulties faced by such unaffiliated parties and the investor
protection afforded by the federal acts, the change is probably justified.
If the offering is a secondary distribution for or on behalf of an affiliate
of the issuer or a person in a control relationship with the issuer then that
party has the means of securing a state registration by the issuer and like-
wise the means of securing an application for listing of the securities upon
a national securities exchange. In this type of situation there is little public
interest in regulating sales expense and no necessity to impound the proceeds
of the distribution pending its successful completion, both of which are nor-
mally important functions of the state Blue Sky acts. Some of the issuer's
outstanding securities, however, may have been given for intangible proper-
ties, and investor protection may require that these securities be placed in
escrow pending the success of the venture. The secondary distribution here
being for or on behalf of an affiliate or controlling person, the public interest
requires of such person the same protection as if the distribution were by the
issuer itself. Furthermore, the primary function of the state acts in passing
upon the quality or "soundness" of the securities still remains, as do other
functions hereafter to be mentioned. All the investor protection offered by the
state acts may be lost, however, by the use of the exchange exemption. The
affiliated or controlling party, whose securities are being distributed, has
the means to use such procedure to escape state registration of the securities.
When the public interest in these secondary distributions and the investor
protection provided by the Blue Sky acts are balanced against the protection
afforded by listing it seems again that the basis of the exchange exemption
is very doubtful.
To summarize, it seems apparent that in both primary and secondary dis-
tributions better investor protection would be secured if the states eliminated
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their exchange exemptions, 48 and that the free interchange of outstanding
securities would be facilitated if the states granted an exemption for securi-
ties sold in secondary distributions for or on behalf of persons not affiliated
with or under common control with the issuer. The simplest and most
effective means of immediately eliminating the use of the exchange exemp-
tion to escape the provisions of state Blue Sky laws on original primary dis-
tributions is for the Securities and Exchange Commission to vitalize Section
19 (b) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act so as to prevent the listing of
securities upon exchanges before the completion of their primary distribu-
tions. This would not prevent the use of the exemption on the primary
distribution of an unissued portion of a previously issued security, or on a
secondary distribution, but such action by the federal commission would point
the way for broader action by the states.
5. Regulation of Section 3 (b) Exemptions.-Section 3 (b) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 empowered the Commission by its rules and regulations to
add any class of securities to those exempt by Section 3 thereof, subject to
such terms and conditions as it might prescribe, if it found that the enforce-
ment of the Securities Act with respect to such securities was not necessary
in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering. The
exemption was limited to issues where the aggregate offering price did not
exceed $100,000. By virtue of this grant of authority the Commission has
adopted regulations A, B and B-T exempting various types of small issues
of securities upon conditions adapted to the character of the particular issues
and to the technique generally employed in their distributions.9 Brief pro-
spectus requirements are imposed as a condition for obtaining exemption for
certain types of issues, but there are no requirements that the prospectus or
offering sheet shall be filed with the Commission except on issues of shares
of stock in a corporation or similar interests in a trust or unincorporated
association, 0 first mortgage real estate notes or bonds of less than $500
denomination, 51 oil and gas interests,52 and certificates of interest in oil
royalty trusts or similar types of trust or unincorporated associations. 3
No formal approval or action by the Commission is. required to validate the
481f this were done it would be necessary for the states to grant an exemption for
true broker transactions in order not to interfere with the operations of exchanges
and over the counter markets when no solicitations of purchase are involved. Compare
North Carolina's interpretation of its statute [132 C. C. H. 6516, ff 27 (1940)], and
Section 4 (h) Virginia Securities Law [Va. Acts 1928, c. 529, as amended by Acts 1934,
c. 341].49Throop and Lane, supra note 45, at 93-95, discuss these exemptions.5ORegulation A, Rule 202, Securities & Exchange Commission
51Regulation A, Rule 203, Securities & Exchange Commission.
52Regulation B, Rule 320, Securities & Exchange -Commission.
O3Regulation B-T, Rule 370, Securities & Exchange Commission.
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use of the prospectus, a copy of which must be delivered prior to the con-
clusion of any contract of sale to every person solicited to buy the security
in question. The regulations do provide that the offering sheets on oil and
gas interests and the prospectuses on certificates of interests in oil royalty
trusts are subject to a modified form of stop order proceeding.54 Also, after
notice to the Commission, any securities offered to the public for cash, other
than oil and gas interests covered by regulation B and certificates of interest
in oil royalty trusts or similar types of trusts or unincorporated associations
covered by regulation B-T, are exempt if they are sold in compliance with all
applicable state: provisions relating to the registration of securities and
dealers.5 * It is not the purpose of this article to give detailed discussion to the
exemptions provided by regulations under Section 3(b) of the Act. Instead,
it is sufficient to point out that with the elimination of the civil liabilities of
Section 11,5" and the prospectus requirements in certain instances, and the
stop order proceedings in other instances, there arises here a group of securi-
ties in the regulation of which the state commissions must continue to be
vigilant if adequate investor protection is to be rendered in the interstate
distributions of such issues.
6. The Use of False or Misleading Communications on Interstate Issues
After Meeting Federal Prospectus Requirenwnts.-Notices, circulars, adver-
tisements, letters or' communications, written, or by radio, which offer any
security for sale are within the definition of "prospectus" in the Securities
Act of 1933.57 If these notices, circulars, advertisements, letters or communi-
cations do not meet the requirements of Section 10 of the Act their trans-
portation or communication in interstate commerce or in the mails is a vio-
lation of Section 5 (b) (1) even though a registration statement is in effect
as to the security offered for sale. These communications are not deemed
to be prospectuses, however, if prior to or at the same time with such com-
54Regulation B, Rule 340, Securities & Exchange Commission, and Regulation B-T,
Rule 370, Securities & Exchange Commission.
55Regulation A, Rule 210, Securities & Exchange Commission.
56Civil liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act [48 STAT. 82 (1933), as amended
by 48 STAT. 907 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77k (1935)] would not arise since there is
no registration required on exempt securities. However, as a condition of securing
the exemption the prospectus or offering sheet requirements are imposed in certain
cases. If these requirements are not met absolute civil liability under Section 12 (1)
of the Securities Act [48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 771 (1935)] would be
imposed upon the interstate seller. If the prospectus or offering sheet requirements are
met civil liability for misleading statements therein would arise only under Section 12 (2)
of the Act, except as effected by Regulation B, Rule 332, concerning representations in
offering sheets on oil and gas interests and Regulation B-T, Rule 376, concerning
representations in prospectuses on certificates of interests in oil royalty trusts or similar
types of trusts or unincorporated associations.
57Section 2 (10), Securities Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT.
905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77b (1935).
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munications a written prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 is
sent or given to the person to whom the communication is made by the
person making such communication or his principal. Thus the provisions of
the Securities Act preclude the use of false or misleading notices, circulars,
advertisements, letters or written communications prior to sending or giving
to the prospective purchaser a prospectus meeting the requirements of Sec-
tion 10. There is apparently nothing in the Act, other than perhaps injunctive
relief58 and criminal penalties59 for violation of Section 17(a), to prevent the
use of false or misleading printed, typed or written communications after
the prospectus requirements have once been met.60 Fortunately, however,
the state acts in many instances offer some relief in this situation. State
Blue Sky laws generally prohibit the use of any advertising matter in con-
nection with the sale of any security unless a copy thereof shall have been
submitted to, and approved by, the state commission.6 ' A correlation of
58Section 20 (b), Securities Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 85 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77t
(1935).59Section 24, Securities Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 87 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77x (1935).60Civil liability would not arise under Section 12 (1) of the Securities Act [48 STAT.
84 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 771 (1935)] as there is no violation of Section 5 in such
a case [48 STAT. 77 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77e
(1935) ]. It is conceivable that a purchaser in such a case, failing to read the prospectus
or to understand it if he did read it, might purchase a security relying on the false or
misleading statements in these later notices, circulars, advertisements, letters or written
communications. However, it is still doubtful if such a purchaser has any relief under
Section 12 (2) of the Act where the untrue statement must have been contained in "a
prospectus or oral communication" to create liability thereunder. The extra notices,
circulars, advertisements, letters or written communications are not "oral" and within
the statute, and by Section 2 (10) [48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 905
(1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77b (1935)] they are not a "prospectus." If, under any theory,
the purchaser were permitted to sue he might have difficulty refuting a contention that
he knew of such untruth or omission when he purchased since the prospectus originally
delivered to him presumably would show the falsity of the later misleading supplemental
material. This is apparently an instance when the common law remedy of deceit would
offer more protection to the purchaser than would the civil liability provisions of the
Security Act. As stated above the only other protection afforded by the federal act
would be perhaps action by the Commission to enjoin the use of such communications
or the invoking of the criminal penalties of the Act under the theory there is involved a
violation of Section 17 (a) [48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77q (1935)1. See
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Macon, 28 F. Supp. 127 (D. Colo. 1939) ; accord,
Coplin v. United States, 88 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 9th 1937). In most instances, how-
ever, such action would come only after completion of the unlawful use of the extra
communications and would not constitute an exercise of the administrative process to
prevent injury to investors.61For a few of the state provisions thereon see:
Alabama: ALA. CoDE ANN. (Mitchie, 1928) c. 35, art. 12, § 9883, and Rule 19 [131
C. C. H. 169 (1940)].
Illinois: Section 21, Ill. Securities Act. Ill. Laws 1919, p. 351, as amended by S. B.
628, Laws 1933 and S. B. 225, Laws 1935.
Michigan: Section 16, Mich. Rules & Regulations [131 C. C. H. 2043 (1940)].
Minnesota: Minn. Laws 1925, c. 192, § 15, as amended by Laws 1927, c. 66, § 10,
Laws 1933, c. 408, § 11 and Laws 1937, c. 481, § 2.
Ohio: Rule A-I, Ohio Rules and Regulations [131 C. C. H. 3352 (1940)].
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the registration requirements of the state acts with those of the federal act,
as is suggested hereafter, will give the state commissions a copy of the
federal registration statement which they can use in considering and approv-
ing the submitted advertising matter. The state commissions are thus in
a position to be an invaluable administrative aid in seeing that there shall be
no violations of the spirit, if not the letter, of the federal Securities Act in
such cases.
7. Prospectus Requirements on Issues Registered with the Federal Corn-
mission.-Even after an issuer has registered a security with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and fully met the registration requirements of
the federal act, it or the underwriter may avoid the delivery of the federal
prospectus to prospective purchasers by skillfully avoiding the use of any
means of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails to carry or transmit any communication which would be deemed a
"prospectus" under the terms of the act, and by avoiding the carrying of
the securities in the mails or in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale
or delivery after sale.62  Here is an instance where it would be well for
62See Sections 2 (10), 5 (b) and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 [48 STAT. 74 (1933),
as amended by 48 STAT. 905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77b (1935); 48 STAT. 77 (1933),
15 U. S. C. A. § 77e (1935) ; 48 STAT. 84 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 771 (1935)1. To be
a prospectus the communication must offer a security for sale. Inter-office communica-
tions of the issuer or underwriter concerning a distribution in another state would not
be "prospectuses" nor violate Section 5 (b) (1). The sales literature could be prepared
in the state in question and there distributed without the use of any of the means of com-
munication or transportation in interstate commerce or the mails necessary to violate
Section 5 (b) (1) or to create civil liability under Section 12 (2). The securities them-
selves could be transferred between offices in different states without violating Section
5 (b) (2) by enclosing therewith a prospectus meeting the federal requirements even
though Section 5 (b) (2) probably has no application to such inter-office shipments. The
use of the federal prospectus by the sales office might then be avoided by distributing
the securities without the use of any of the means of communication or transportation
in interstate commerce or the mails necessary to bring the transaction under Section
5 (b) (2) of the Act. It is thought, therefore, that an interstate distribution of a regis-
tered security may be carried on without the use of the federal prospectus. The nearest
approach to this problem which has arisen thus far in an actual case is Farrell v.
Reynolds, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 117 (Sup. Ct. 1939), although it cannot be said to be
exactly in point. In that case the court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's second cause of action based on an alleged violation of Section 12 (1) in not
furnishing plaintiff a copy of the federal prospectus prior to the offering or delivery
of the stock. Plaintiff had alleged that "in carrying out the sales" of the stock "the
mails and other means and instrumentalities were used and the said underwriting is
within the purview of the Securities Act," and that the issuer was a Michigan corpora-
tion. The court's decision was based on the proposition, as it phrased it, that "It is
not clear from such allegations that the plaintiff's stock was sold to the plaintiff through
the mail or in interstate commerce." The case can be said to stand for the proposition
that civil liability under Section 12 (1) for not furnishing the required prospectus, will
not be imposed upon a vendor of shares where the allegation against him does not show
that the shares purchased by the complaining party traveled (at all) through the
channels of interstate commerce or the mails. See note (1939) 34 ILL. L. REV. 368. The
opinion does not make it clear, however, that the allegation showed a delivery of the
stock in some state other than Michigan so the case cannot be said definitely to advance
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the states to integrate their acts with the provisions of the federal act by
requiring that all sales material within the federal definition of "prospectus"
meet the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act when used to
solicit sales of securities registered thereunder.63 This provision could be
appropriately incorporated in even the state acts of strict "fraud" type. It
has been suggested that the application of such a state enactment need not
be limited to cases where written soliciting material is given to the purchaser
but could cover oral and telephone solicitations as well.64 This application,
however, would prove quite expensive and there is no apparent need to
deliver a copy of the prospectus to every person solicited orally or by tele-
phone. The preferable solution would be for the states to impose the same
time requirements upon delivering the federal prospectus in such cases as
the thesis presented in this footnote, although such is intimated when the court said,
"The mere allegation . . . that the Covered Wagon Company rthe issuer] was a Michi-
gan corporation is not sufficient to bring the plaintiff's cause of action within the pro-
visions of the Federal Statute." 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 117, 120 (1939). By this statement
the court seems to recognize that the shares were delivered outside the charter state.
If so, the case can be said to advance the thesis herein presented.63The enforcement of such a state provision, no doubt, would be met by the objection
that it constituted an unauthorized delegation of legislative authority since Section 10
of the Securities Act [48 STAT. 81 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15
U. S. C. A. § 77j (1935)1 confers upon the Securities and Exchange Commission au-
thority to change the required content of prospectuses, classify them and prescribe their
fbrm and contents according to the nature and circumstances of their use. Reference to
past cases does not give a satisfactory answer to this objection.
There seems to be little doubt but that the states may incorporate into their own
statutes by reference existing provisions of federal acts. State v. Weber, 125 Me. 319,
133 Atl. 738 (1926) ; Comnmonwealth v. Alderman, 275 Pa. 483, 119 Atl. 551 (1923) ;
Santee Mills v. Query, 122 S. C. 158, 115 S. E. 202 (1922). In another line of cases
involving attempts by states to incorporate into their statutes by reference future enact-
ments by Congress and rules and regulations thereunder the courts have held the state
acts to be unlawful delegations of legislative authority, State v. Gauthier, 121 Me. 522,
118 AtI. 380 (1922) ; State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 121 Me. 438, 117 Atl. 588 (1922) ;
In re Opinion of Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N. E. 453 (1921) ; Smithberger v. Banning,
129 Neb. 651, 262 N. W. 492 (1935). The problem under consideration, however, can
be distinguished from these cases. Nevertheless, the courts might feel bound to hold
unconstitutional state statutes requiring that all sales material within the federal defini-
tion of prospectus meet the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act when used
to solicit sales of securities registered thereunder even though such supplementary
statutes were for the support of the federal act and covered situations beyond federaljurisdiction.
If constitutional provisions or previous decisions in a particular state indicate it would
be unconstitutional to require that all sales material within the federal definition of
prospectus meet the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act when used to
solicit sales of securities registered thereunder, then the state act should require that
all such material meet requirements thereafter to be promulgated by the state commis-
sion. The ultimate result could then be accomplished by the state commission adopting
in detail the prospectus requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission as
they are constituted from time to time. The constitutional differences in the two pro-
cedures are well illustrated by the decision in Brock v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. (2d)
291, 71 P. (2d) 209 (1937).
64Throop, supra note 11, at 95.
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are imposed by the federal act so that the prospectus requirements may be
kept as uniform as possible.0 5
B. Burdens of the State Acts and Their Elimination by Correlation
1. Issue Registration Requirements.-The greatest objections to the con-
tinued existence of local state securities laws concern their registration re-
quirements on securities to be distributed. This is not true, of course, when
the state act is of the "fraud" type, or "dealer license" type, because they
raise no problem of registration whether the distribution is local or inter-
state in character. Furthermore, sales by issuers to underwriters, even
under the "notification" or "qualification" acts, are exempt and raise no
problems of meeting Blue Sky requirements. Sales by underwriters to dealers
are expressly exempt in some of the states having "notification" or "quali-
fication" statutes and the registration may be made by the local dealer before
a public offering of the securities. 66 In other states the registration is to
be made by the issuer, and sales to dealers of the security being distributed
would come within the prohibition that "no securities ... shall be sold within
this state unless such securities shall have been registered" as provided in the
act. If the underwriter itself is to make a public offering of the issue within
the state the registration requirements will first have to be met. The result
is that it has become the usual practice to include in the underwriting agree-
ment a proviso that the issuer will take whatever action the underwriters
may reasonably request to qualify the issue under the Blue Sky laws of the
various states.
, Thus, after the preparation of the registration statement required by the
federal act it becomes necessary to meet the diverse registration requirements
of the various states. This is no small matter. If the issue is a large one
a ready market probably cannot be found in a single state. Furthermore,
the issuer may desire to secure the benefits from a widespread market
covering most of the country. If the issue is an especially desirable security
the investors of one state should have an opportunity to acquire their portion
of the distribution. These factors will require the registration of the securi-
ties under the laws of a number of states. The magnitude of this under-
taking is illustrated by the experiences of those who have attempted to follow
a registration through the Securities and Exchange Commission and securi-
65It appears that by Florida Laws 1933, c. 16,174, § 4, the Florida Legislature has
attempted to confer on the state securities commission authority to require that all
sales material within the federal definition of prospectus meet the requirements of
Section 10 of the Act [48 STAT. 81 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906 (1934),
15 U. S. C. A. § 77j (1935)], when used to solicit the sale of securities registered there-
under. The Florida Commission has apparently not seen fit to exercise this authority.
131 C. C. H. 851 (1940).66Local dealers, however, usually are not anxious to assume responsibility for de-
tailed statements of fact concerning issuers.
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ties commissions of the various states. Their studies show an unorganized,
expensive and wasteful procedure. 67  Sometimes the issuer does not have
time after meeting the federal requirements to meet the requirements in
all the states in which it is desired to make offers before the expiration of
the twenty-day, or less, "cooling" or waiting period required under the federal
act,68 the result being that a simultaneous offering of the securities in all
states cannot be had.
If state registration requirements should not be barriers to the proper flow
of investments for industry, especially at a time when the country is trying
67In one instance in 1937 when it was desired to offer the securities in twenty states
it was found that after preparing the federal registration statement these states required
tile information to again be set up in twenty different forms. PROCEEDINGS, ZOTH ANNUAL
CONVENTION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONERS (1937) 29-30. A
study made by Halsey-Stuart & Company, Inc., in about 1936, revealed that to secure
the registration of a nonexempt issue under the federal Securities Act and the Blue
Sky laws of twelve states required the furnishing of 733 items of information, includ-
ing schedules, exhibits, etc. Of these items, 184 were required by the federal form A-2,
while the remaining 549 items were required by the combined application forms of the
twelve states. Of the 549 items required in the twelve state forms, 314 items duplicated
or were similar to the 184 items required by the federal form. This left a total of 235
items of information requested in the twelve state forms concerning which the same
or similar information was not requested in the A-Z federal form. PROCEEDINGS, 19Tr
ANNUAL CONVENTION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONERS (1936)
112-113. These experiences probably could not be duplicated exactly today as there has
been some correlation of registration requirements since these surveys were taken, but
the progress along this line has been so limited that the obligation to register securities
in a number of states is still a major undertaking.
In addition, under most state acts and the rules and regulations thereunder, where
there has been no attempt to correlate the state and federal registration requirements,
the operation of the state and federal systems results in those states requiring double
submission of much of the required information. In addition to the required state regis-
tration statements, generally, the state acts and the rules and regulations thereunder
require the submission to the state commission of all sales literature to be used in the
distribution. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) c. 35, art. 12, § 9883, and Alabama Rule
19 [131 C. C. H. 169 (1940)]; Section 15, Minnesota Securities Act [Minn. Laws 1925,
c. 192, as amended by Laws 1927, c. 66, § 10, Laws 1933, c. 408, § 11, and Laws 1937,
c. 481, § 2] ; and Sections 7 and 8, Oklahoma Securities Act [Okla. Sess. Laws 1931,
c. 24, art. 111. This would include the federal prospectus. So far as the same informa-
tion is required in the state registration statement as in the federal prospectus, whether
in the same form or otherwise, these provisions result in double submission of the same
material. Thus the state registration and prospectus requirements show an unorganized,
expensive and wasteful procedure.68 As originally passed, Section 8 (a) of the Securities Act [48 STAT. 79 (1933).
15 U. S. C. A. § 77h (1935)] provided, in effect, that no registration statement filed
thereunder, except for certain governmental issues, could become effective until twenty
days after being filed with the Commission. Congress has recently amended this section
of the act, however, to provide the Commission with discretionary authority to acceler-
ate effective dates. Pub. Act No. 768, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Aug. 22, 1940) § 301. In
exercising this discretionary authority the Commission is required to give due regard to
the adequacy of the information respecting the issuer previously available to the public,
to the ease with which the nature of the securities to be registered, their relationship
to the capital structure of the issuer and the rights of holders thereof, can be under-
stood, and to the public interest and the protection of investors. See Securities Act
Release No. 2340 announcing the general policy which the Commission proposes to
follow in exercising this discretionary authority.
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to step up its production in many lines of national defense, there is reason
for seeking correlation of the state provisions with those of the federal
Securities Act. To do this it has been suggested that the issuer of interstate
issues be permitted to file copies of the federal registration statement or
prospectus with the states in satisfaction of their registration requirements. 69
It would seem that ordinarily this would be sufficient. It is the purpose of
the federal Securities Act to require that the registration statement shall
not contain an untrue statement of a material fact, or omit to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to keep the statements therein
from being misleading.70 The Securities and Exchange Commission has
defined the term "material" to include "such matters as to which an average
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the
security registered."71  If such a disclosure is not made in the registration
statement a stop order may be issued under Section 8 (d) and civil liabilities
will arise under Section 11 (a) of the Securities Act. It is not easy to see
from a theoretical standpoint why this disclosure requirement under the
federal statute does not include everything generally needed by the state
authorities even where the Commission before permitting registration has to
"find that the sale of the security . . . would not be fraudulent and would
not work or tend to work a fraud upon the purchaser, and that the enter-
prise or business of the issuer is not based upon unsound business princi-
ples."'72 It seems inconceivable that the omission of any fact which is neces-
sary to be stated to prevent the working of a fraud upon the purchaser, or
to show the unsoundness of the issuer's business principles, would be per-
missible under the federal requirements, for surely such facts are "matters
as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed
before purchasing the security," and are necessary to be stated to make other
statements not misleading. The federal requirements are so broad that
theoretically there should be no other relevant information to be required.
It therefore seems a small matter that the state and federal authorities have
not agreed upon the form of the registration statements; because, regardless
of the form, the information needed and required by the state acts, unless
they are requiring information which does not concern the findings their
commissions are to make, should be included in the federal registration
statement. With this matter settled we can proceed to a consideration of
69Smith, supra note 10, at 254-255, and Throop, supra note 11, at 94-95.
7OSection 8 (d), Securities Act of 1933 [48 STAT. 79 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77h
(1935)], and Section 11 (a), Securities Act of 1933 [48 STAT. 82 (1933), as amended by
48 STAT. 907 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77k (1935)1.71Page 14, Instruction Book for A-2 Corporations, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.72Section 8, Florida Securities Act. Florida Laws 1931, c. 14, p. 899.
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how the federal registration statement can be utilized under the forms of
the various state acts.7
3
2. Correlation of Issue Registration Requirements.-If the state act is of
the "fraud" type or "dealer license" type the filing of a registration state-
ment would not be necessary. Where the local statute is of the "notification
and qualification" type it is necessary to consider separately the two means
of registration. Under these acts only nonexempt securities of issuers meet-
ing stated earning requirements over specified periods, and obligations meeting
stated security requirements, may be registered by notification.74 A satis-
factory correlation of the federal and state registration requirements for
such securities could be worked out by the states accepting the federal
prospectus or registration statement, amendments thereto, copies of all
notices and orders concerning the effectiveness thereof, and a separate state-
ment showing that the securities meet the mathematical formula set out
in the statute providing registration by notification. -When appropriate in-
formation showing the ratio required under the statutory formula is contained
in the federal prospectus or registration statement this separate statement
could consist merely of references to that information, and could be very
simple and brief.75  Of course, provision should be made for the issuer's
73The writer by personal letter recently addressed the following question to the
securities commissions of ten states where by statutes or regulations federal prospectuses
or registration statements are accepted as state registration statements or as exhibits
thereto :
"Do you find any need for more information than is contained in the federal regis-
tration statement or prospectus and amendments thereto to enable you to exercise your
statutory duties ?"
All of the state commissions answered the writer's question. The Commissions of
Indiana and Missouri were firm in their beliefs that the federal forms do not contain
sufficient information, while the Vermont commission stated simply, "We sometimes find
need for different information than is contained in the federal registration prospectus ...."
The commissions of Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas
and West Virginia stated that generally the federal registration statements provide
ample information.
These answers show the existing division of opinion as to the completeness for state
purposes of the information contained in the federal forms.
"
4Section 6, Minnesota Securities Law. Minn. Laws 1925, c. 192, as amended by Minn.
Laws 1927, c. 66. Compare the new Louisiana requirements. Section 7 (b), Louisiana
Securities Act [La. Acts 1940, Act 262J.
75Another suggestion for correlation of registration by notification requirements is
that the states enlarge this classification to include securities of issuers meeting the
federal requirements for use of registration statement form A-2. This form is used for
registration of securities (except such securities as to which a special form is specifically
provided), by any corporation which files a profit and loss statement for three years
and has either made annually available to its security holders for at least ten years
financial reports including at least a balance sheet and profit and loss or income state-
ment or had a net income for any two fiscal years of the five fiscal years preceding the
date of the latest balance sheet filed with the registration statement. See Instruction
Book for Form A-2, Securities and Exchange Commission. If securities registered on
form A-2 were accepted by the states for registration by notification, the state require-
ments could be met by the filing of the federal registration statement, amendments
thereto, and copies of all notices and orders concerning the effectiveness thereof. The
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filing with the state commissions copies of all future amendments, notices
and orders. 76
Nonexempt securities of issuers unable to meet the state requirements for
registration by notification would then be registered by "qualification." In
this type of registration, correlation of the state acts with the federal act
again could be accomplished by permitting the registrant to file with the
state commission the federal registration statement, amendments thereto and
copies of all notices and orders concerning the effectiveness thereof. On
the basis 6f this information the state commissions could determine if the
sale of securities would work a fraud upon purchasers or if the issuer's
business were based upon sound business principles, and act accordingly to
register or refuse to register the securities for sale. Again, provision should
be made for the issuer's filing with the state commissions copies of all future
amendments, notices, and orders.
If the state act is of the "notification" type alone, or of the "qualification"
type alone, the same correlation as just outlined can be accomplished, except
that under the former there will be no occasion to require a supplementary
statement showing that the securities meet the ratio of the statutory formula
for registration in a "notification and qualification" state.
This correlation of the registration requirements of the state and federal
acts can begin at once under the form and.rule making powers existing in
many state commissions, if they can be brought to realize that there is no
essential difference between the information they need and that already re-
quired in the federal registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933.
Many state commissions have authority to prescribe the forms that shall be
used for their local registration and to specify what information shall be
securities of the newer and "unseasoned" issuers would then be registered by qualifica-
tion, the states accepting the federal registration statement, amendments thereto, and
copies of all notices and orders concerning the effectiveness thereof, in lieu of present
registration requirements. On the basis of this information the state commissions
could exercise their statutory duties of passing upon the soundness of the securities.
Compare the new Louisiana provisions. Section 8, Louisiana Securities Act. [La. Acts
1940, Act 262]. In both registration by notification and registration' by qualification,
provisions should be made for the issuer's filing with the state commissions copies of all
future amendments, notices and orders.
7GThe Illinois Securities Act, Section 7 (c) [Ill. Laws 1919, p. 351, as amended by S. B.
225, Laws 1935 and H. B. 771, Laws 1939], provides for telegraphic advice of amend-
ments to the federal registration statement to be followed by submission of duplicate
copies of such amendments within 10 days thereafter. The Michigan Securities Commis-
sion, under a broad rule making power [Section 8, Michigan Blue Sky Law (Mich. Pub.
Acts 1923, Act. No. 220, as amended by Pub. Acts 1931, Act No. 255, and Pub. Acts
1935, Act No. 37)] has provided wider coverage by requiring that the applicant covenant
that within five days after filing any amendments or immediately upon receipt of any
notices or orders affecting its registration the applicant will forward to the state com-
mission two duplicate copies of amendments and two photostatic copies of the notices
and orders. 131 C. C. H. 2086-2087 (1940). Most effective results probably would be
secured under a combination of these provisions.
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included therein.77 Under such statutes correlation with the federal regis-
tration requirements would be a simple matter.
A difficulty presents itself in some states which may require amendment
of the local statutes before complete integration of registration requirements
as herein suggested can be accomplished. This difficulty is that some state
statutes set out in mandatory form just what shall be included in the regis-
tration statement to be filed thereunder. 7s Of course, in individual instances
this may not include any information not already required to be contained
in the federal registration statement and the state commissions, finder their
express or inherent rule making powers, may still provide for correlation
without amending the local laws. In other instances these mandatory pro-
visions may require the inclusion of considerable material in addition to that
contained in the federal registration statement. Complete correlation would
necessitate the elimination of the mandatory provisions in such cases. In
the meantime considerable relief from present registration requirements in
these states can be secured by the local commissions' accepting the federal
registration statement plus the supplementary mandatory data for the local
registration, pending a better legislative correlation at the state's next legis-
lative session.79  In any case the states80 should take steps immediately to
77Minnesota: Section 5, Minnesota Securities Law. Minn. Laws 1925, c. 192, as
amended by Laws 1933, c. 408, § 7.
Alabama: ALA. CODE AxN. (Michie, 1928) c. 35, art. 12, § 9879, as amended by S. B.
415 (1931).
Kentucky: Ky. Laws 1937, S. B. 151, § 21.
7SColorado: Section 4, Colorado Securities Act [Colo. Laws 1923, c. 168, § 41.
Indiana: Section 8, Indiana Securities Law [Ind. Laws 1937, H. B. 3741.
Such mandatory provisions often raise further problems by requiring the balance sheet
or financial statement of the issuer to be as of a period not more than sixty days, and
sometimes thirty days, prior to the date of filing. See Section 9, Illinois Securities Act
[Ill. Laws 1919, p. 351, as amended by Laws 1931, H. B. No. 971, Laws 1933, S. B.
628, Laws 1935, S. B. 2251; Section 13, Georgia Securities Law [Ga. Laws 1920, Act
No. 754, as amended by Laws 1933, No. 281, Laws 1937, H. B. No. 160]. The financial
statement under the federal act is required to be as of a date not more than ninety
days prior to the date of filing of the registration statement. Item 54, Registration
Statement A-i, and Instruction Book for Registration Statement Form A-2. In many
cases the issuer in preparing the federal registration quite naturally depends upon the
ninety day provision, only to find when he begins state registrations during the twenty
day or less "cooling" period that he may have to bring the financial information up to
a more recent date. This is expensive and also causes delay. It would simplify regis-
tration of securities if the states would eliminate such mandatory provisions.
79 If this is found to be necessary in any state it is suggested that the legislature con-
sider substituting a provision similar to Section 4, Florida Securities Act. Florida
Laws 1933, c. 16,174.
SOIt is not thought, however, that this whole burden of correlation of registration
requirements should rest upon the states. It is not the purpose of this article to contend
that the federal forms are perfect. The only contention advanced here is that the federal
Securities Act requires the stating of the information needed by the state commissions
to enable them to make their required findings before permitting local security distribu-
tions. The duty therefore rests upon the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek
continually to design its registration forms so they may bring out fully the information
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eliminate their registration barriers which are impeding the proper flow of
investment funds to industry."'
3. Nonexempt Sales by Underwriters to Local Dealers Sales by under-
writers to local dealers are not exempt in thirteen or fourteen states,8 2 and
assuming that such a sale would constitute an "offer," a "sale," or "business
transacted" within the states in question it becomes necessary for all under-
writers to register as dealers in those states, or turn the allotment for a
particular state to one or more underwriters who are registered as dealers
therein, or make no sales in such states. It is, of course, expensive for
all the underwriters to register as dealers in each of those states, and turning
the allotment for a particular state to the underwriters who are registered
therein is said to involve difficult practical problems.8 3 These difficulties arise
because the states in question probably have felt that a local dealer might
not have accurate information, or sufficient information, concerning the
issuer to provide a satisfactory registration of out of state securities. Statutes
failing to provide an exemption for sales by underwriters to local dealers
probably can be said to represent indirect means of securing registrations by
the issuers or underwriters. Regardless of the custom of underwriters to
require of the issuer the qualification of securities under the state acts, the
need for state provisions not exempting sales by underwriters to local dealers
expires upon a correlation of registration requirements as heretofore sug-
gested. When an interstate issue can be registered with the state commission
only by filing therewith the federal registration statement, amendments there-
required to be stated therein by the terms of the Securities Act. It is pertinent to
state that the Investment Bankers Association has been particularly critical of the forms
provided under the federal act. In a letter to the writer, supra note 6, Mr. A. G. Davis,
Field Secretary of the Association, stated: ". . . In preparing these forms, the S. E. C.
paid but little or no attention to all the work that had been done up to date on forms
for state securities [Blue Sky] laws .... Issuers and underwriters, and dealers prac-
tically without exception, find great need for additional correlation of security regis-
tration requirements. It is unfortunate that the S. E. C. to date has not evidenced the
same attitude toward the constructive assistance in matters of this character as has the
majority of the state Commissioners. I am confident, however, this will right itself in
due course, . . ." For discussion of existing federal forms and suggestions for their
simplification, see Neff, Securities Act Forms for Registrato (1938) 51 HARv. L.
Rnv. 1358.
slSimilar registration difficulties on broker, dealer and salesmen registrations arise
out of the many divergent state requirements thereon. Space does not permit their full
consideration and discussion in this article but the writer feels that much can and
should be done in this field to establish some semblance of uniformity as to registration
forms, financial statements, the dates thereof, and renewal dates on licenses once granted.
It is expected that the National Association of Securities Commissioners soon may
recommend a program meeting these problems as it now has a special committee on
uniformity working thereon. See Address of Mr. John T. Jarecki of the Illinois Securi-
ties Department, before the Central States Group Forum, March 29, 1940, entitled The
Uniform Licensing of Dealers and Brokers.82For a listing of these states see Smith, supra note 10, at 250 n.8
-
3Smith, supra note 10, at 250.
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to, and copies of all notices and orders concerning the effectiveness thereof,
each state commission will have a registration prepared by the issuer.84 It
would seem therefore that after such correlation these states might very well
exempt sales by underwriters to local dealers.,
4. State Registration of Securities Required to be Made by a Registered
Local Dealer.--An attempt to secure a widespread distribution of a small but
sound security where there are only one or two underwriters may raise the
possibility of their being unable to secure simultaneous offerings in all states,
because certain states under "notification" or "qualification" types of statutes
require the registration to be by a registered dealer doing business in the
state in question. It is probable that the members of such a small under-
writing group would not be licensed to do business in all the states in ques-
tion; thus necessitating that some one of them first become a registered
dealer in each of these states before it would be possible to register the
securities therein, if it is desired to have the securities qualified with the
states at the expiration of the twenty-day, or less, waiting or "cooling"
period under the federal Securties Act. 5 It would seem that there is need
for the states, where registration of securities must be by a registered dealer
licensed to do business therein, to provide that an out of state underwriter
may at the same time file both an application for registration as a dealer and
an application for registration of the securities to be sold, provided he
appoints the state commissioner his agent to accept service of process on
suits arising out of the later purchase of the securities and that the twenty-day,
or less, federal waiting period has not expired.8 6 This change in state laws
plus the correlation of the registration requirements on securities herein
suggested should assure the underwriters that state registrations may all
84Except in an interstate secondary distribution by a nonaffiliated person not in a
control relationship with the issuer. It has been suggested previously that the states
should follow the example set by the Securities Act of 1933 and also exempt such
secondary distributions. See supra pages 267 et seq.85This could not be solved by a sale to a registered dealer already doing business in
the state in question since under the Securities Act, Section 2 (3), only "preliminary
negotiations between an issuer and any underwriter" are exempt from the definition
of "sale" and the prohibitions of the act until the registration statement becomes effec-
tive. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77b (1935).86The problem here considered is not the same problem as the one just previously
discussed where a number of states do not classify as an exempt transaction sales of
securities to local dealers. In the prior case the sales could not be made because of
state requirements. In the instant case sales to local dealers cannot be made until the
federal registration statement becomes effective under the federal Securities Act. The solu-
tion offered in this case concerns the means of securing a state registration during the
twenty day or less waiting or "cooling" period. When this period has expired and the
federal registration has become effective, if the state registration has also been accom-
plished, underwriters, whether all are registered as dealers in the state or not, may
then make sales to local dealers if such sales are exempt transactions.
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be completed by the time the federal registration becomes effective.8 t
5. Publication of "Announcement" Advertisements or "Newspaper Pros-
pectuses."--The publication of an "announcement" or "tombstone" advertise-
ment by the underwriting group which merely identifies the security, states
the price thereof, names the persons by whom orders will be executed and
from whom a prospectus meeting the requirements of the federal Securities
Act may be obtained, does not constitute a violation of that act.sS In addi-
tion, the Securities and Exchange Commission sometimes permits the publi-
cation of a "newspaper prospectus" in longer form. 89 The publication of
such advertisements by the'underwriting group is said to be a violation of
some state acts by those members of the selling group who are not registered
as dealers therein, even though the advertisements include appropriate
"hedge" clauses making it clear that they are being published on behalf of
only those who are registered dealers in securities in such states. 0 If this
is a criticism of the state acts it is not a particularly serious one, as it is no
great burden on the underwriters to arrange the advertisements appearing
in a particular state so they may include only the names of those underwriters
who are registered dealers therein. A more serious, objection to the state
acts and their administration arises from the contention by some state com-
missions that such advertisements published in financial magazines or news-
papers outside the state, but brought into the state in interstate commerce
or the mails, constitute a violation of the state acts by those members of the
selling group who are not registered as dealers therein. 91 Such statutes, or
the interpretations thereof, would require underwriters to register in each of
these states if the newspaper or magazine in which the advertisement was
to appear bad a national circulation. This interpretation seriously limits
the value of the exemption of this type of advertising by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and seems to justify a revision of the state laws in
question, so they may harmonize with the national practice in this instance.9 2
8 7For another suggestion on how this problem may be solved see Throop, supra
note 11, at 93-94.88Section 2 (10), Securities Act of 1933. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT.
905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77b (1935).89Under the authority granted the Commission by Section 10 (b) (4) of the Securities
Act of 1933 [48 STAT. 81 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77j (1935)], to classify prospectuses
according to the nature and circumstances of their use.90Smith, mpra note 2, at 1140-1141 and 1144. See also, Smith, m.pra note 10, at 251.
If it is desired to permit such advertisements see the statutory provisions of Ohio and
Michigan [Onlo GEN. CoDE ANN. (Page, Supp. 1935) § 8624-2, and Section 16, Michi-
gan Blue Sky Law (Mich. Pub. Acts 1923, Act No. 220, as amended by Pub. Acts 1929,
Act No. 136, and Pub. Acts 1935, Act No. 37).].91Smith, supra note 2, at 1142-1143.92Other problems of correlation are raised by Sections 3 (a) (9), 3 (a) (10) and the
last sentence of Section 2 (3) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 264 (a), Chap-
ter X, of the Bankruptcy Act, exempting from registration various securities. [48 STAT.
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
III. CORRELATION ON INTRASTATE DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Civil Liabilities
State Blue Sky acts commonly do not subject those who deal only in intra-
state transactions to as severe civil responsibility to the purchaser as is
imposed by the federal Securities Act. The Indiana Securities Law pro-
vides no civil remedies except rescission by the purchaser when the sale is
75 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c (1935) ; 48 STAT.
74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77b (1935); 52 STAT. 914 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 793
(Supp. 1939) ].
Section 3 (a) (9) of the Securities Act exempts securities exchanged by the issuer
with its existing security holders exclusively, where no commission or other remuneration
is paid or given for soliciting the exchange. Section 3 (a) (10) of the act exempts
securities issued in exchange for outstanding securities, claims or property interests
where the exchange is approved after hearing by any court or governmental authority
authorized by law to grant such approval. Section Z64 (a), Chapter X, of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, provides an exemption for the securities issued by the receiver, trustee
or debtor in possession pursuant to paragraph (2) of Section 116 of the Att or any
transaction in any security issued pursuant to a plan in exchange for securities or debts
of the debtor or partly for cash and/or property, or issued upon exercise of any right
to subscribe or conversion privilege so issued.
State laws commonly exempt company offers exclusively to existing stockholders
provided no commissions or fees are paid in connection with such offers and they like-
wise generally exempt the exchange of securities in bona fide reorganizations. IowA
CODE (1935) § 8581-c5 (d).The same considerations prompt state exemptions of such
transactions as prompt the federal exemptions, except the exemption provided by Chap-
ter X of the Bankruptcy Act, where by Article VII the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is given notice of hearings, and may be deemed a party in interest and may
render advisory reports upon proposed plans during the course of the reorganization.
52, STAT. 888-892 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 556-580 (Supp. 1939). Such procedure, how-
ever, in reorganizations under Chapter X should afford sufficient investor protection for
the states to grant the same exemption even though their commissions are not deemed
parties in interest and may not render advisory reports. States which do not recognize
the federal exemptions discussed above are imposing unnecessary burdens upon those
transactions. (Note the provisions of the California Corporate Securities Act, Sections
2 (b) and 2 (c) [CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 3814], as amended by Laws
1931, c. 423, §§ 1, 2, Laws 1933, c. 898, § 1, and Laws 1937, c. 477). In order to elim-
inate confusion and conflicting interpretations the states should adopt uniform exemp-
tions following the terms of Sections 3 (a) (9) and 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Act
and Section 264 (a), Chapter X, of the Bankruptcy Act. See Throop and Lane, supra
note 45, at.102, for a discussion of the above exemptions under the Securities Act.
By the definition of "sale," "sell," "offer to sell," or "offer for sale" contained in Sec-
tion 2 (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 a conversion privilege, issued or transferred
with a security, which cannot be exercised until some future date is not deemed a sale
of such other security until the issue or transfer of the other security. Thus the other
security does not need to be registered under the act until the specified future time
arrives. The statutes of some states, for example Iowa and Ohio, provide similar
exemptions in such cases. IowA CODE (1935) § 8581-c3; Orno GEN. CODE ANN. (Page,
Supp. 1935) § 8624-4 (6). The laws of some states, however, contain no express pro-
visions concerning conversion privileges issued or transferred with a security but which
cannot be exercised until some future date. Whether the other security needs to be
registered in those states depends on the wording and possible construction of their
definitions of "security" and of "sale." This is an unsatisfactory situation and correla-
tion of the state and federal acts would require that the states adopt a definition of
"sell" or "sale" containing a provision similar to the last sentence of Section 2 (3) of
the federal Securities Act which appears to be based upon sound principles. See Smith,
supra note 10, at 245, for a criticism of the state acts in the above cases.
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made in violation of the (security and dealer registration) provisions of the
act.93 The Illinois Securities Act provides the same remedy94 but goes a bit
further by providing that the offer or sale of securities, in any other manner
or form than specifically set forth in the information required to be filed
under the provisions of the act and the rules and regulations of the Secre-
tary of State, shall be considered prima facie evidence of fraud.95 Neither
of these provisions gives the purchaser a civil remedy comparable to that
granted by Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act. State registration
of securities generally requires the filing of a detailed registration statement
but no civil liabilities are provided for untrue statements contained therein
or the omission to state material facts required to be stated or necessary
to keep the statements therein from being misleading. If the imposition of
civil liability by Section 11 of the federal act, as a means of securing a full
and accurate disclosure and as a relief for wronged investors, is sound
when the distribution is an interstate one, then it likewise should be sound
when the distribution is made entirely intrastate. So long as we find this
difference in the state and federal standards of civil responsibility to pur-
chasers, we may expect to find the poorer issues and fraudulent issues con-
centrated in intrastate distributions. The protection of investors who purchase
securities distributed in intrastate transactions demands that the states estab-
lish civil liabilities for false statements contained in state registration state-
ments. Furthermore, experience is showing the necessity for civil responsi-
bility, in intrastate distributions, of the same standard as that set out in
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act. Michigan has already established such
responsibility, practically enacting word for word, so far as applicable, the
civil liability provisions of Section 12(2), the limitation of actions provisions
of Section 13, and the undertaking for costs provisions of the last sentence
of Section 11(e) of the Securities Act.90
B. Information on Previous Registrations
It would be well also for the states, by appropriate statutes or rules and
regulations, to require the registrant of an intrastate issue to give full and
complete information regarding whether the applicant or issuer ever filed a
registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, on
this or any other issue, and if so the action thereon.97  This requirement
93Section 19, Indiana Securities Law. Ind. Laws 1937, H. B. No. 374.94Section 37, Illinois Securities Act. Ill. Laws 1919, p. 351,' as amended by an Act
approved June 11, 1921.
951d. § 36.96Section 16, Michigan Blue Sky Law. See note 90 supra.97See Item 5, Michigan Form S-2 [131 C. C. H. 2056 (1940)] for an example of how
this suggestion may be used in a state registration statement on an intrastate distribu-
tion of securities.
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might give the local commission considerable insight into the applicant's or
the issuer's business methods in the past and be an invaluable aid in passing
on the "quality" of the present issue tendered for registration. Furthermore,
we may expect to see some issuers withdrawing their federal registration
statements on current issues and turning to intrastate distributions when
refusal or stop order proceedings are begun under Sections 8(b) or 8(d)
of the actY8 In such cases the local commissions need to be informed of
the issuer's action as such facts may indicate fraud in the securities sought to
be registered.
IV. SURVEY OF WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO CORRELATE THE STATE AND
FEDERAL SECURITIES AcTs
A. Securities Violations Records of the Securities and Exchzange Com-
mission
The most successful bit of correlation between the security jurisdictions
of the state and federal governments has been one of correlation of informa-
tion and activities rather than of laws. The violations records of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, established in 1935 as a result of a conference
between a committee representing the National Association of Securities
Commissioners and federal officials, have become the central index and
clearing house for information relating to security frauds both past and
present in the United States and Canada. State commissions may secure in-
formation from the records at any time, while current information is published
in a monthly confidential bulletin distributed to official and unofficial agencies
engaged in the prevention and punishment of security frauds. This cor-
relation of information and activities has aided materially both the state
and federal commissions in the administration of their respective acts.99
980n the right to withdraw a registration statement, see Jones v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 654 (1936), and the discussion thereon
by Johnson and Jackson, The Securities and Exchange Commiysion; Its Organization
and Functions under the Securities Act of 1933 in (1937) 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
14-16. Compare Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra, with Oklahoma
Texas Trust v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 10th
1939) ; Resources Corporation International v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 103
F. (2d) 929 (App. D. C. 1939); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Hoover, 25
F. Supp. 484 (N. D. Ill. 1938).
9 9The violations records now contain data upon thousands of individuals while new
information regarding convictions, indictments, injunctions, and stop, cease and desist
orders is continually added thereto. Contributions of information come from state com-
missions, state and federal prosecuting officials, the Post Office Department, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Better Business Bureaus, Investors Protective Committees,
Investment Bankers Associations, Chambers of Commerce, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission itself, and various associations and individuals. FIRST ANNUAL
REPORr OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMISsION (1935) 35; SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1936) 58; PROCEEDINGS, 19TH
ANNUAL CONVENTION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONERS, (1936)
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B. Correlation by State Statutes
As might be expected, without any uniform plan having been provided,
the attempts of the states by statutes to correlate their registration require-
ments with those of the Securities and Exchange Commission have resulted
in various provisions-some practical, but others vague and unhelpful. The
Virginia statutes hint that the state wants nothing of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 00 On the other hand, Louisiana,' 0' Ohio, 0 2 Massa-
103-104; PROCEEDINGS, 18TH ANNUAL CONVENTION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURI-
TIES COMMISSIONERS (1935) 123-124.
100 Section 4 (d) of the Virginia Securities Law. Va. Acts 1928, c. 529, as amended
by Acts 1934, c. 341, and Acts 1940, S. B. 255.
10 Louisiana adopted a new Blue Sky Act in 1940 (La. Acts 1940, Act 262). The
new act provides for the registration of certain securities by notification in addition
to registration by qualification. This type of registration is correlated with the federal
requirements by providing that in lieu of the information otherwise required for regis-
tration by notification the issuer or dealer may file a copy of the federal registration
statement, and all information in connection therewith, filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, including the circular to be used on the public offering. This
is to be deemed sufficient compliance with the state requirements.
Registration by qualification may be made under this new Louisiana Act by filing
with the state commission a copy of the registration statement and all information in
connection therewith filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in lieu of all
other state requirements, if such filing is made before a stop order is issued under the
federal act. The state commissioner is authorized to Pccept this as sufficient compliance
with the requirements of the act for registration by qualification.
It must be recognized that, on the whole, this is a very satisfactory correlation of the
registration requirements of a notification and qualification statute. In the interests of
Louisiana investors, however, it must be observed that the act makes no provision for
filing with the state subsequent amendments to the federal registration statement or
notices or orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the effective-
ness of the federal registration.02Ohio, by an act effective in 1938, has provided:
"In so far as any information required to be filed with the division under any section
of this act is contained in a registration statement filed with the securities and exchange
commission (of the United States) and such registration statement is in effect, such re-
quired information may with the consent of the division be furnished by filing with the
division a copy of such registration statement together with an affidavit of an inter-
ested party that the same is in effect." OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 8624-23a,
added by H. B. No. 794, § 2, Zd Spec. Sess. 1937-38 (effective Jan. 31, 1938).
The Ohio rules, however, adopted by the Commission under the authority thus granted,
provide only that in cases where the application is for registration by qualification (as
contrasted with registration by notification, where the requirements are simple and go
only to showing that the issuer meets certain specified earnings and security ratios) and
the applicant has filed a federal registration statement, that registration statement will
be accepted by the Commission in lieu of exhibits required by the registration by qualifi-
cation section of the Ohio act. Such an issuer files the regular application form and
attaches thereto a copy of the federal registration statement noting the pages therein
on which appear the pertinent required information. 131 C. C. H. 3360 (1940).
The most serious criticism of the Ohio correlation is that it does not require amend-
ments to the federal registration statement, which are filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission after the registration statement has become effective, to be filed
also with the state commission. The Ohio statutes and rules, furthermore, contain no
provisions or procedure requiring the issuer to inform the state authorities when notices
or orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the effectiveness of the
federal registration have been issued.
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chusetts, 0 3 West Virginia,104 South Carolina,'0 ° Vermont, 00 and Illinois1°7
103Massachusetts has provided (1938) that in lieu of the information formerly re-
quired for its registration by description, after notice of intent to sell securities, the
commission shall accept (subject to requiring additional information) a copy of the
final prospectus or offering sheet, or original prospectus or offering sheet and subsequent
amendments, used for registration under the federal Securities Act. Section 5, Massachu-
setts Securities Act, as amended by Mass. Acts 1938, c. 445, § 6. ,
On the whole, this seems to be an entirely adequate correlation of registration require-
ments for this type of state statute except that it contains no provisions or procedure
requiring the issuer to inform the state authorities when notices or orders of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, concerning the effectiveness of the federal registration,
have been issued. See also 131 C. C. H. 1953 (1940) for the Massachusetts Rules and
Regulations correlating financial statement requirements of brokers who are members of
registered national securities exchanges.
104 West Virginia in 1935 attempted to correlate its registration by qualification statute
with the federal acts by granting the state Securities Commissioner authority to make
rules and regulations he deemed necessary "to cooperate effectively with the Securities
and Exchange Commission." No rules have been provided, however, under this grant
of authority, except that the state registration form does inquire whether the security
has been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and whether the
registration of this or any other security of the applicant has ever been revoked by that
commission. The instructions on the state registration form "recommend" that a copy
of the "Federal form" be filed therewith and that the registrant may answer state items
by specific reference to items on the federal registration statement if a copy thereof
is filed with the state application. No provisions are included in this form for handling
amendments to the federal registration statement or prospectus or notices or orders by
the commission concerning the effectiveness thereof. The state forms for registration
of oil and gas interests, investment companies and investment trusts contain no pro-
visions for correlation with the federal requirements. It seems quite evident that this
is not a well worked out plan of correlation under the broad grant of authority given
the state commission. See West Virginia Laws 1935, S. B. 165, and 131 C. C. H. 4676-
4676-2, 4677-3 (1940).
0 5 South Carolina in 1937 attempted to correlate its registration requirements with
those of the Securities and Exchange Commission and was partially successful in its
efforts. It extended to certain securities of foreign governments, registered under the
Securities Act of 1933, an exemption [S. C. Acts 1937, Act No. 1, § 4 (b)], and by a
vague provision attempted to make an exempt transaction of the issuance of securities in
consolidations, mergers and adjustments of capital stock when the plan of distribution is
contained in a registration statement filed for twenty days with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. S. C. Acts 1937, Act No. 1, § 5(f). North Carolina in 1935
had adopted practically this same provision. N. C. Laws 1935, S. B. 436, § 4 (6).
Neither of these acts specify what effect a refusal order, stop order, amendment or
withdrawal of such federal registration statement may have on the state exemption.
South Carolina also provides that securities which are subject to registration by noti-
fication shall include securities of "seasoned" corporations as now defined for registra-
tion under form A-2 under the federal act, and as "the same may hereafter be defined
or designated or classified." The act also provides that these securities may be registered
by giving notice of intent to sell and filing a statement of the amount to be sold within
the state, a copy of the prospectus filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and payment of the required fees. S. C. Acts 1937, Act No. 1, § 7.
This statute contains no provisions or procedure, however, requiring the issuer to
inform the state authorities of subsequent amendments to the federal prospectus or when
notices or orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the effective-
ness qf the federal registration have been issued.
The South Carolina Commission also has recently adopted the uniform registration
forms recommended by the National Association of Securities Commissioners (see
page 291 infra, and notes 109, 110, and 111 infra) but the commission has not made it
clear whether they are to be used for registration by notification or by qualification, or
both. 131 C. C. H. 3875-3889 (1940). In view of the express statutory provisions in
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have by express statutes and rules thereunder provided means for correlation
the state act, however, setting out in mandatory form the procedure for registration by
notification (S. C. Acts 1937, Act No. 1, Pt. II, § 7) it seems likely that the uniform
forms are intended for use only in cases of registration by qualification.
'
0 6 Vermont in 1939, by statute, provided that in lieu of the information regularly
required to register a security for sale by qualification its commission may accept a
copy of the federal registration statement or prospectus. The act attempted no correla-
tion of the requirements for registration of securities by notification or "description" and
the commission has adopted no rules or forms attempting any additional integration.
The act makes no provision for handling amendments to the federal registration state-
ment or prospectus or notices or orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission
affecting the issuer's registration. VT. PuB. LAws (1934) § 6835, as amended by Laws
1939, S. B. 72, § 3.
10 TThe Illinois Securities Act, which has been amended and built on to as the years
have passed, contains a recent attempt to correlate partially its registration requirements
with those of the federal act.
It provides that class "C" securities, which in general are those of issuers meeting
specified earning requirements, may be registered for sale by the Secretary of State
when he has been given certain required information; or if the securities are registered
under the federal Securities Act he may register them if the application contains the
amount of the issue, amount to be offered in Illinois, price, underwriting costs, and is
accompanied by two duplicate copies of the federal registration statement, all amend-
ments thereto, prospectus, fees and other additional data if required. Provision is also
made for written or telegraphic advice of material changes in the federal registration
statement, to be followed by submission of duplicate copies of such amendments within
ten days. Section 7 (c), Illinois Securities Law. See Laws 1919, p. 351, as amended
by an Act approved June 11, 1921, Laws 1935, S. B. No. 225, and Laws 1939, H. B.
No. 771. The Illinois form 7 (c) has been adopted for registration under this pro-
vision and follows the statute closely. 131 C. C. H. 1140-41 (1940).
Illinois has made no statutory attempt to correlate its registration requirements with
those of the federal act on its class "D," "investment contracts" and "investment trust"
securities. The Secretary of State, under his rule and form making power, has helped
the situation, however, on registration of class "D" or "speculative" securities by pro-
viding a short form for registration of such issues as are registered under the federal
Securities Act. This form is simple, requiring little more than the federal registration
statement and prospectus require, and both these instruments must be submitted as ex-
hibits. 131 C. C. H. 1151-56 (1940).
All other Illinois forms are elaborate and require that if the securities have been
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the dates thereof and the
action thereon should be shown, attaching the registration statement and amendments
thereto, except that exhibits may be eliminated in certain instances. But these forms
contain no provisions for answering the state questions by reference to items in the
federal registration statement, or no provisions that the federal forms be a substitute for
the state requirements. See Illinois forms, 131 C. C. H. 1139-7, 1141-7, 1142, 1145,
1145-5, 1155-7, 1157-4, 1159-3, 1159-4, 1161-3, 1161-4, 1163, 1163-2 (1940). These forms
therefore often result in a duplication of answers. The Illinois forms also require that
if the issuer has not complied with, and does not intend to comply with the federal act,
it attach opinion of counsel setting forth why such compliance is not necessary.
The supplemental registration statements required by the Illinois act provide for the
submission to the Secretary of State of copies of any amendments filed to the federal
registration statement since the last such report. Again no provision is made to avoid
duplication of information where it would be possible to do so. See Illinois forms, 131
C. C. H. 1147-5, 1148, 1163-7, 1165-4, 1166, 1167-4 (1940).
In a private communication to the writer the Illinois Secretary of State, who adminis-
ters the state act, wrote: "In drafting the revised regulations, the thought of correlation
with the forms required by the Securities and Exchange Commission was kept in mind.
Many of the interrogatories will permit applicants to supply the same answers as would
be used in preparing a registration statement for the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion." The writer feels that the Illinois commissioner has made great progress but
that he should have gone, at least, a step further and permitted the answering of state
questions by reference to appropriate items in the federal form in these latter instances.
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of their registration requirements with those of the Securities and Exchange
Commission by using the federal registration statement or prospectus as an
exhibit to the usual state registration statement, making references to the
federal statement or prospectus for answers to state questions, or by using
the federal statement or prospectus as the state registration statement, adding
thereto only a few local requirements. The most serious defect of some of
these statutes is that they make no provision for handling amendments to the
federal registration statement or prospectus. The next most serious objec-
tion in certain instances is that the states have not agreed whether the fed-
eral registration statement or prospectus should be used in cases of regis-
tration by notification or registration by qualification, or both, where the
state act contains both provisions. Texas, Maryland, Oregon, and North
Carolina statutes contain miscellaneous provisions integrating the state and
federal acts in particular instances.' 08 These states, with the exception of
Maryland, however, have not attempted a complete statutory correlation
of even their registration requirements with those of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The lack of space in this article prevents a detailed
examination and evaluation of these recent additions to the state Blue Sky
laws, but it is only fair to acknowledge that in some instances their contents
have had a bearing on the writer's suggestions for future integration of
the state and federal regulations.
C. Correlation by Rules and Regulations
A number of the state commissions, without specific statutory direction,
have attempted to lower the registration barriers to facilitate a free flow of
108Texas provides an exemption for certain securities of foreign governments if they
are on "the list approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United
States." Section 23 (b), Texas Securities Act (Tex. Laws 1935, H. B. No. 521).
Maryland, in 1937, added dealer registration requirements to its fraud type statute
and provided that the registration statement thereon contain the same information as is
required of brokers and dealers in over the counter markets. The Maryland provision
permits the filing of a certified copy of the broker dealer registration statement filed
with the federal commission, when accompanied by the required letters of recommenda-
tion. Section 10a, Maryland Blue Sky Law, added by Md. Laws 1937, c. 348, § 1. See
also forms in 131 C. C. H. 1875-1880 (1940).
The Oregon Securities Law, Section 20 (Ore. Laws 1939, c. 397), provides an
exemption under Sections 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended [48
STAT. 75 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c (1935) (In-
correctly described in the Oregon statute as the "Federal Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934")], for the securities of a non-judicial reorganization of all corporations, other
than utilities, by providing for a hearing as to the fairness of the plan and the proposed
exchange of securities thereunder before the state securities commissioner. It is doubt-
ful if this is the type of hearing and approval Congress had in mind when Section
3 (a) (10) was made a part of the Act. But the Oregon provision apparently is within
the terms of the federal exemption. See Throop and Lane, supra note 45, at 106,
and Comment, Effect of Section 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Act as a Source of
Exemption for Securities Issued in Reorganizations (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1050.
Another miscellaneous statute is the North Carolina provision discussed supra note 105.
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investment funds through an exercise of their rule and form-making powers.
The National Association of Securities Commissioners appointed a com-
mittee on Coordination and Uniformity in 1935, which reported two years
later after working out a plan, together with specimen forms, designed to
establish approximately uniform practices among the states for the handling
of security issues.'1 9 The committee was assisted by representatives of
the Investment Bankers Association. The forms recommended by this com-
mittee, had they been adopted by the states, would have established not only
practical uniformity of registration requirements throughout the country but
also a fairly satisfactory type of correlation of state and federal registration
procedures. The plan did not suggest that the states adopt a uniform in-
flexible form but suggested uniformity of procedure instead. It proposed
the use of only one form supplemented by exhibit forms relating to the
particular class of securities sought to be registered. 110 This proposal was to
accomplish an integration of the state and federal registration requirements
on interstate issues by having a copy of the federal registration statement
and all amendments thereto filed as an exhibit to the state form, in lieu of
certain specified exhibits and in lieu of other exhibits where the information
required therein was fully set forth in the federal form. This was, then,
a workable proposal.
But the suggested forms have not broken down the registration barriers
as was expected. Their adoption by state commissions has been rather
limited. Six states, Indiana, Florida, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Caro-
lina and Texas thus far have actually adopted all or part of them."" Several
other states, apparently not satisfied with the committee proposal, for one
reason or another, have adopted ideas of their own for the solution of
109Montgomery, Report of Committee on Coordination and Uniformity in PROCEED-
INGS, 20TH ANNUAL CONVENTION NATIONAL AssOcIATIoN OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONERS
(1937) 21-23.
'nOFor an example of a state form and exhibit forms designed as recommended by
the Committee on Coordination and Uniformity of the National Association of Securi-
ties Commissioners see Florida form 8, 131 C. C. H. 882-886 (1940). Cf. Texas forms,
131 C. C. H. 4175-4189 (1940).111Florida, 131 C. C. H. 851, 882-86 (1940) ; Indiana, 131 C. C. H. 1256-1260 (1940);
Nebraska, 131 C. C. H. 2575-2579 (1940) ; New Mexico, 131 C. C. H. 2978-2984 (1940);
South Carolina, supra note 105; and Texas (First three divisions, I. General Issues,
II. Investment Trusts, III. Oil and Gas Issues), 131 C. C. H. 4175-4189 (1940).
It is to be noted in each of these instances that the forms are being used for regis-
tration by qualification or similar applications. It is to be noted, also, that the forms
provide that amendments to the federal registration statement must be filed with the
state commission and that the applicant shall furnish full information relating to any pro-
ceedings of the Securities and Exchange Commission delaying, suspending or denying
the effectiveness of the federal registration.
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the problem. It can be said briefly that Michigan 1 2 and Missouri' 13 have
done the best job among these states, although the Missouri forms, since they
make no attempt to correlate the state's registration by notification require-
ments with those of the federal act, leave much to be desired. The Michigan
Commission, operating under a statute providing only for registration by
qualification and granting broad rule making powers, has apparently covered
the usual problems quite adequately and simplified its forms even more than
was proposed in the suggested uniform forms. Also, Rhode Island has de-
parted from its statutory theory of permitting sale of securities upon notice
112 The Michigan commission, administering a qualification type of statute, has pro-
vided, under its broad rule making powers [Section 8, Michigan Blue Sky Law (Mich.
Pub. Acts 1923, Act No. 220, as amended by Pub. Acts 1931, Act No. 225 and Pub.
Acts 1935, Act No. 37)] an excellent correlation of its forms. The Michigan rules pro-
vide for two forms, S-1 and S-2, the former to be used when a registration statement
covering the proposed offering has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. See 131 C. C. H. 2041 (1940). This form, among other things, provides for a
statement of underwriting costs, organization papers, by-laws and two duplicate copies
of the registration statement and prospectus, and amendments thereto, filed under the
Securities Act of 1933, exhibits thereto, and photostatic copies of all orders and notices
of 'the Securities and Exchange Commissicn pertaining thereto.
The rules provide that applicant covenants to file two duplicate copies, within five
days, of all amendments or supplemental information filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and upon receipt thereof to file with the state commission photo-
static copies of orders and notices of the federal commission, or state regulating bodies,
relating to the registration therewith. 131 C. C. H. 2086-2087 (1940).
Form S-2, used on securities not registered with the federal commission, requires
applicant nevertheless to give detailed information concerning any experiences applicant
or issuer may have had with that commission on other issues. 131 C. C. H. 2056 (1940).
See also Form S-3, the Michigan exempt transaction securities application, requiring
a legal opinion on the basis of the exemption if the security is not registered under the
Securities Act of 1933. 131 C. C. H. 2088 (1940).
Michigan Rule 18 provides that qualification for sale of shares in investment trusts,
investment companies, or investment or installment contract issues shall be subject to
the underlying securities all meeting certain requirements, or being fully listed and regis-
tered securities on a national securities exchange registered under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 131 C. C. H. 2044 (1940).
113Missouri, with a statute providing for both registration by notification and qualifica-
tion, has adopted no rules [131 C. C. H. 2351 (1940)] under its rule making powers, but
under the provisions of Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 7730, as amended by Laws
1939, S. B. 129, the commission has provided a fairly effective plan (Form Q) for
correlating its registration by qualification with the Securities Act requirements by.
providing that the federal prospectus or registration statement shall be filed as an ex-
hibit, references to be made thereto in answering questions on the state form. 131 C. C.
H. 2375-77 (1940). No provisions are made for handling amendments to the federal
registration statement or prospectus or notices or orders concerning the effectiveness
thereof, nor has any correlation been attempted on securities to be registered by
notification.
Missouri has a separate form for the registration of investment trust shares (MT 42)
but it is poorly correlated with the federal requirements, being subject to the criticism
previously directed at the Illinois form for registration of such securities since both
contain identical provisions concerning the federal registration. 131 C. C. H. 2395-99
(1940). See supra note 107.
See also Form X, the Missouri exempt securities application, inquiring whether the
securities in question have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. 131 C. C. H. 2378 (1940).
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of intent to sell and has imposed restrictions upon the sale of oil and gas
interests in the state which do not meet the requirements of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.1 4  The commissions of Iowa and Washington
require the submission of copies of the federal registration statement when
the security has been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, but the correlation of requirements is so incomplete that the Iowa and
Washington result is merely to impose more burdens on the issuer.1 5 The
California, Colorado, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Maine, Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin forms do no more than recognize the existence of the
114 The Rhode Island Blue Sky act requires only that dealers and salesmen be licensed
and notice of intent to sell securities be given before offering them for sale to the public.
The state commissioner, apparently exercising authority given him by virtue of R. I.
Gen. Laws 1923, c. 273, § 4 (d), has adopted, however, specific regulations covering the
sales of oil and gas interests in the state. These regulations provide that "only offer-
ings which have met all the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission!'
will be considered for qualification. 131 C. C. H. 3751 (1940). Form R, for state
registration of these securities, requires the applicant to attach a certified copy of the
offering sheet or registration statement filed with the federal commission and provides
that "No [such] interests shall be offered unless they shall first have been qualified by
the Securities and Exchange Commission at Washington, D. C." 131 C. C. H. 3782
(1940). It is conceivable that an intrastate distribution of Rhode Island oil and gas
interests might be exempt from these regulations since they would be exempt from the
"requirements" of the Securities Act if Section 3 (11) [48 STAT. 75 (1933), as amended
by 48 STAT. 906 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77c (1935)] were satisfied. If the statement
on Form R is to prevail, however, such securities would have to meet the offering sheet
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation B since Form R
makes no distinction between interstate and intrastate distributions. Aside from this
inconsistency between the regulations and Form R neither of them contain any pro-
visions for handling amendments to the offering sheet or notices or orders of the federal
commission concerning the effectiveness thereof.
1"5 The Iowa commission, operating under a statute permitting the sale of non-exempt
securities only upon registration by qualification, but granting the commission broad
form making authority [IowA CODE (1935) c. 393-Cl, as amended by Laws 1937, c. 209],
has provided by its Form 8 the same registration requirements for all securities.
Form 8 requires, as additional information, that the federal registration statement be
attached thereto or the submission of a legal opinion that registration with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission is not necessary. The form makes no provision for the
registration statement to be a substitute for other required information or for even the
answering of required questions by reference to answers contained in the federal form.
131 C. C. H. 1377-1378 (1940).
The Iowa annual report form then requires a statement on whether the securities
have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and a statement of
any stop orders or rulings by that Commission. 131 C. C. H. 1375-76 (1940). But
this information is required only in this form and not necessarily upon the promulga-
tion of such orders or rulings.
On the whole, the Washington forms provide no correlation with the federal registra-
tion requirements. The only recognition of the existence of the federal act by the
Washington commission is contained in the instructions for preparation of the statutory
statement required from metalliferous mining companies. Instruction 6 provides: "If
filed with the Federal Securities Exchange Commission, enclose registration statement
and prospectus." This is obviously no correlation of the registration requirements of
the state and federal acts. This procedure only results in duplication of information
before the state director. Wash. Laws 1933, c. 69, and Laws 1937, c. 178. 131 C. C. H.
4586-87 (1940).
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federal acts.116 Neither the statutes, rules or forms of the remaining states
contain any provisions for their correlation with the federal acts, or even pro-
visions recognizing the existence of such acts or the commission administering
them.
V. CONCLUSION
The present value of the state Blue Sky acts on interstate distributions ot
securities can now be determined. This survey has revealed that the state
acts by supplementing the federal acts are a decided benefit to the investing
public in many instances. The quality of the securities is passed upon after
the federal commission has forced a full disclosure of all the material facts.
Needed investor protection is offered in several instances, and by means not
included in the national legislation. In fact, state Blue Sky laws are a
necessary part of any comprehensive national plan of security regulation.
This survey also has revealed that these same laws are imposing needless
burdens on interstate distributions of securities, burdens which have become
barriers to the free flow of investment funds to industry. It is not necessary,
however, to balance these benefits and burdens against each other. To do
so might prove unfavorable to the cause the states espouse. The preferable
solution is to eliminate the needless burdens, thus retaining only the benefits
accruing from such regulations. This can be done by a careful correlation
of the state and federal requirements. Furthermore, it has been found that
the states may appropriately integrate in some instances their regulation of
intrastate security distributions with the federal interstate requirements to
the end that intrastate investors will receive more effective protection.
It has been the purpose of this article to suggest appropriate and appar-
ently sufficient means of correlating certain requirements and provisions of
the state and federal acts, where it seems necessary to do so either for the
purpose of eliminating needless burdens or affording more adequate investor
protection. A survey of what the states have done to accomplish these
purposes, since the first exercise of the federal jurisdiction over seven years
ago, clearly indicates that generally they have not seen or appreciated the
many problems involved, or the need for such correlation. In the few in-
stances where the states have acted, most of their new statutes, rules or
forms are insufficient to eliminate all the needless burdens imposed by their
acts or to give more adequate investor protection. Also, there has been little
uniformity in these new provisions. It therefore seems evident that here
"l6 California Regulations, 131 C. C. H. 473 (1940) ; Colorado Regulations, 131 C. C.
H. 553 (1940) ; Kentucky forms, 131 C. C. H. 1581-83, 1583-92 (1940) ; Maine forms, 131
C. C. H. 1781, 1785, 1786 (1940) ; New Hampshire forms, 131 C. C. H. 2776 (1940) ;
Pennsylvania forms, 131 C. C. H. 3676 (1940) ;'Virginia forms, 131 C. C. H. 4476-78;
Wisconsin forms, 131 C. C. H. 4770-73 and 4778-82 (1940).
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is a problem calling for the unified action of all who seek improvement in
our laws and elimination of needless burdens on legitimate business. It
seems that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
should offer to the states for adoption at the earliest possible moment either
a new uniform securities act or a group of uniform amendments designed
to accomplish the correlation of the state and federal requirements and
provisions." 7  Then interested business and professional groups such as the
Investment Bankers Association, The National Association of Securities
Dealers, and the American Bar Association, along with interested indi-
viduals, shoula make a continuous and concentrated effort in each of the
states to secure the acceptance and adoption of the uniform legislation. 118
Such an approach to the solution of the problem is necessary. Otherwise,
we cannot hope that the states, without direction and suggestions, will be
able to accomplish all that is possible by such a correlation.
117The writer believes such a project, especially as regards registration requirements,
to be just as essential to the national defense program as the recent amendment of the
Securities Act [Pub. Act No. 768, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Aug. 22, 1940) § 301] and other
amendments to that act which have been proposed "in order to speed up the flow of
capital into industry and make capital available to numerous industries which are vital
to our defense program." See H. R. 9807, and H. R. 10013, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940),
and exchange of correspondence between Chairman Jerome N. Frank of the Securities
and Exchange Commission and E. F. Connely, President of the Investment Bankers
Association of America, released by the Commission June 21, 1940.
11SIt can be said that the Investment Bankers Association now has something of
this nature in mind. Mr. A. G. Davis, Field Secretary of the Association, in a com-
munication to the writer under date of April 22, 1940, in discussing present practices
for the correlation of state and federal registration requirements stated, ". . . Certain
variations in the state laws interfere with the complete adoption of this practice, but we
are hopeful of changing this situation in due course by asking for appropriate amend-
ments to the respective state laws, with the active support of the state Securities Com-
missioners. . . . Perhaps next year, when practically all of the state legislatures are in
session, they will be able to clear up a number of these situations."
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